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1 Introduction 
All over Africa, countries are adopting structural adjustment policies with the hope 
of arresting two decades of economic deterioration. This deterioration has been 
attributed, among other things, to inappropriate trade and payments policies, such 
as overvalued exchange rates and exchange controls, high tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions which result in a divergence between world prices and domestic prices 
leading to policy-induced distortions with considerable macroeconomic 
implications (World Bank, 1990a). Central to these structural adjustment 
programmes has been the liberalization of trade and payments. 
At the theoretical level, it is argued that the imposition of controls on 
international trade and payments may result in both micro- and macro-level 
distortions leading to adverse effects on resource allocation and economic 
performance. Liberalization of the trade and payments regimes removes these 
distortions and creates an enabling environment conductive to better economic 
performance. This may occur in the case of a devaluation through the effect on 
the relative prices of traded and non-traded goods and the relaxation of 
quantitative controls (World Bank, 1990a). 
Trade and payments liberalization will have implications for employment, 
economic growth, balance of payments, government budgets and inflation. Of 
relevance also is the question of the sequencing and sustainability of the 
liberalization process. 
The context within which liberalization takes place is essential to the 
sequencing and sometimes to the effects. Where liberalization takes place from a 
controlled regime facing shortages, import liberalization may be essential to 
support exports (Bevan et al„ 1987). 
In general, studies on trade and payments liberalization show favourable 
effects on employment, economic growth and the balance of payments. A World 
Bank study of 19 countries found that there were small short-run unemployment 
cffects for some countries, but in general, unemployment was seen to be 
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insignificant in countries pursuing fast and strong liberalization (Papageorgiou, 
1990). But this study did not include any African economies. 
Experience varies across the continent depending upon the initial conditions 
before liberalization, structure of the economy, sequencing of the liberalization 
programme and level of external support. The current research is an attempt to 
document one such experience. 
This study examines the experience of the trade and payments liberalization 
process in Ghana. In particular, it focuses on its effect on the balance of payments, 
government fiscal position and inflation. 
II Evolution of the trade and payments 
regime in Ghana 
Harry Johnson, writing on the relevance of the Asian and Latin American 
experience, concluded that: 
A developing country on a fixed exchange rate which undertakes a 
development programme and for this purpose employs the accepted 
techniques and instruments of planning will inevitably develop a balance 
of payments problem. If it adheres tenaciously to its exchange rate it will 
equally inevitably find itself forced to use its fiscal and other control 
instruments to compensate for the inappropriateness of its exchange rate 
(Johnson, 1970, p. 83). 
The evolution of the controlled regime in Ghana seems to have followed this 
pattern. The regime has been determined primarily by balance of payments, fiscal 
control and industrialization through import substitution considerations. 
It is possible to identify two cycles in the evolution of Ghana's trade regimes 
since the 1950s. Each cycle consists of five phases of the trade regime identified 
by Krueger (1978) and Bhagwati (1978). The first cycle is 1950-71 and the second 
cycle from 1972 to the present day. In the first cycle, Ghana's trade regime went 
through all five phases. 
Cycle I: 1950-61 Phase 
1961-63 Phase 
1963-66 Phase 
1966-67 Phase 
1967-71 Phase 
V, Liberal trade regime 
I, Introduction of controlled regime 
II, Breakdown of control system 
III, Attempted liberalization 
IV, Import liberalization 
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In the second cycle, the first four phases of the trade regimes were experienced. 
Cycle II: 1972 Phase I 
1973-83 Phase I I 
1983-86 Phase III 
1986-89 Phase IV 
Since 1989 it appears that Phase V may have begun. 
F i g u r e 1 Evolution of Ghana's trade regime, 1950-91 
I I I IV V 
1950 
T r a d e a n d paymen ts reg ime 1950-71 
Details of the content of the trade and payments policies for the first cycle 1950-
71 have been documented by Leith (1974). This section therefore provides a 
summary of the evolution of the period's trade and payments regime. 
The period 1950 to 1961 was a period of fairly liberal trade and payments 
regime. As a member of the sterling area, Ghana, in the immediate post-
independence period, was subject to the general prescription of currency 
requirements of the area as a whole. Payments to and from other countries of the 
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area were relatively free while payments to third-party countries were subject to 
sterling restrictions. Within this framework Ghana experienced a fairly liberal 
regime. 
As a result of improved export prices, reserves were built up during part of 
this period, followed by a gradual drawing down of these reserves. World cocoa 
prices increased from US$705 per tonne in 1950 to US$1274 in 1954. There was 
a slight decline in 1955 and 1956, and they rose again between 1957 and 1958. 
Thereafter, cocoa prices declined to their lowest level of US$379 in 1965 (World 
Bank, 1983). The years 1957-59 can be regarded as a period of consolidation in 
which projects started under the five-year colonial development plan were 
completed, while the process of developing the first post-independence plan was 
initiated. 
The first five-year post-independence development plan in 1959 entailed 
massive increases in government expenditure, with a high import content. Real 
private consumption also increased from £295 million sterling in 1958 to £376 
million in 1961 as a result of increased income. This, coupled with falling cocoa 
prices and a liberal trade regime, caused the foreign account deficit to increase 
sharply from US$19.4 million in 1959 to US$94.9 million in 1960, and US$135.1 
million in 1961. With foreign exchange reserves declining sharply and the budget 
deficit rising rapidly, the government resorted to a series of strong measures. An 
austerity budget was introduced, and taxes raised. In July 1961, Ghana's rapidly 
dwindling foreign exchange reserves forced the government to pass the Exchange 
Control Act (Act 71) as part of a policy package to control and conserve foreign 
exchange. The act made drastic changes in the existing foreign exchange market 
(Huq, 1989). Foreign exchange controls were extended, and comprehensive import 
licensing was introduced by December 1961 (Stryker, 1990). In effect, the 
imposition of the controlled regime in 1961 was in response to balance of 
payments difficulties. 
In spite of the deteriorating balance of payments and fiscal deficit situation, 
the government launched the seven-year development plan in 1963-64. This, as 
with the second five-year development plan, involved massive government 
expenditures to boost the import substitution industrialization effort. With the 
government refusing to accept an IMF/World Bank stabilization package involving 
a devaluation, it had to resort to ever-increasing trade restrictions to control the 
balance of payments and provide protection for domestic industry. This culminated 
in increasing pressure on the system resulting in rampant abuse and corruption. 
With seriously depleted foreign exchange reserves, the government resorted to 
increased borrowing abroad. 
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Between 1966 and 1967, Ghana entered Phase III of the controlled regime. 
The new government accepted the IMF/World Bank stabilization package and set 
about trying to stabilize the economy and getting inflation under control by using 
both deflationary fiscal and monetary policies and decontrolling state production. 
The system for allocating import licenses was altered to ensure efficient 
mobilization of domestic resources and adequate supplies of essential commodities 
for consumers (Leith, 1974). In order to avoid wasteful competition and under-
utilized capacity, preference was given to larger, established firms with proven 
trade and financial contacts. 
Nevertheless, although the corruption of the last years of the Nkrumah period 
was avoided, there was still a substantial amount of arbitrariness and inefficiency 
in the allocation procedure. Although the results of this effort were encouraging 
in terms of reduction in the current account deficit, urban unrest increased because 
of growing unemployment, reduced real incomes and declining expenditures on 
education and health services (Stryker, 1990, p. 52). 
The balance of payments (BOP) situation remained precarious. There was 
considerable dissatisfaction with the rigid controls and macroeconomic austerity. 
There was also concern over the effect that rising expectations of possible changes 
in the exchange rate was having on potential foreign investment and a realization 
that donor assistance was unlikely until Ghana corrected its balance of payments. 
Rescheduling medium-term debt provided some immediate relief but not a long-
term solution. 
July 1967 saw the beginning of a liberalized import regime which was 
maintained until 1971. In July 1967, the currency was devalued by 43%, import 
duties were lowered on some selected essential commodities and the government 
committed itself to liberalizing imports over the next four years. However, in view 
of increasing urban unrest the restrictive macroeconomic policies could not be 
maintained. The liberalization therefore occurred with expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies. 
Liberalization policies were continued by the civilian government which took 
over in 1969. As they occurred in the absence of restrictive macroeconomic 
policies, pressure was put on the trade balance, but this was masked by high world 
cocoa prices, foreign aid inflows and some debt relief. Cocoa prices rose from 
US$379 per tonne in 1965 to US$1,108 in 1969. The government took advantage 
of high world market prices for cocoa in 1970 to permit a rapid expansion of 
expenditures and imports through the Open General Licence (OGL). This 
increased the balance of payments deficit. With accelerating inflation eating away 
at the devaluation of 1967, the real effective exchange rate on imports appreciated 
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at the same, time that the imports regime was being liberalized. With a substantial 
government deficit budgeted for 1971-72, upward pressure in prices seemed likely 
to erode import taxes and export subsidies. With a sharp drop in cocoa prices from 
US$997 in 1969 to US$565 in 1971, the trade account went into deficit. Foreign 
exchange reserves at the end of the third quarter of 1971 were less than half the 
trade deficit over the first three-quarters of that year. On 27 December 1971 the 
currency was devalued. 
The government urgently needed foreign inflows to ease the foreign exchange 
constraint. However, any support from the international community was 
conditional upon restrictive macroeconomic policies including a devaluation. In 
addition to the 44% devaluation, government expenditures were cut, and some 
taxes were increased. Prices of most consumer items increased substantially, and 
these prompted a military coup on 13 January 1972. 
The government made some attempts at liberalizing the trade regime between 
1978 and 1980, but these were not sufficient to reverse the decline in these 
variables. The attitude towards the use of the exchange rate was ambivalent and 
objectives were not fulfilled. These was hesitancy in completely removing the 
controls because of the implications this would have on balance of payments. The 
import control system was therefore interfered with. Certain enterprises faced a 
comparatively liberal regime whilst others did not. However, since the government 
was not able to reduce the anti-export bias primarily due to its failure to devalue 
the nominal exchange rate significantly, these attempts at liberalization were 
unlikely to be successful. 
Trade a n d paymen ts reg ime, 1972-89 
Details of the content of trade and payments policies for the first cycle, 1950-71, 
have been documented by Leith (1974). This section, therefore, provides an 
analysis of the policies for the second cycle. 
The year 1972 ushered in the beginning of a period of strict import control 
which was in contrast to the liberalization process begun in 1967. In the following 
ten-year period a plethora of instruments were introduced to achieve the 
government's objectives. There was also a half-hearted attempt at liberalization in 
1977 and 1978. In addition, there were rapid and frequent changes in the 
instruments employed. 
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Exchange rate policy 
Politically the new government found it wise to reduce the rate of devaluation to 
26% by revaluing the currency. It also unilaterally repudiated some of the debts 
and rescheduled the rest. In the same year, the government imposed stiffer import 
and payments controls because the international community was not prepared to 
grant any credit. Ghana had to meet its international obligations from its own 
resources. This led to the beginning of Cycle II, Phase I. It is interesting to 
consider why direct controls rather than exchange rates were used to stem the 
demand for imports. Direct controls were used primarily to restructure imports to 
conform to the policy of import substitution. The overall principle of government 
was self-reliance and a reduction in dependence on external resources. Thus, the 
initial use of direct controls may be explained within the context of government 
wishing to reduce imports significantly. It could also be explained by the need to 
nurture interest groups, e.g., the military. Quotas give a clear idea of what is 
coming in initially. However, the use of quotas within the context of price controls 
introduces distortions to the economy. As this happens, an increasing amount of 
economic activity gets diverted from channels directly under the control of 
government to other channels. The initial objective of control of the economy in 
order to move it in a particular direction is therefore lost since the official 
indicators give an inaccurate picture of the value of output produced and goods 
entering and leaving the economy. As this happens, the tax base of government 
declines, and if expenditures are not able to fall in line, they can put increasing 
pressure on the budget deficit. This may explain what happened in the Ghanaian 
case. The slow-down in the growth rate of export values put a constraint on the 
capacity to import which affected import volumes and the import tax base. 
A fixed exchange rate policy was pursued during the entire period, despite the 
stated policy shift towards a flexible exchange rate in 1978 when the currency was 
devalued. The nominal exchange rate was revalued in February 1972 following the 
December 1971 devaluation. The revaluation of the cedi did not fully reverse the 
depreciation of the real effective exchange rate of the December 1971 devaluation 
(Table 1). The maintenance of strict import licensing after 1972 can then be 
understood since it was only in this way that the balance could be prevented from 
deteriorating further. The change in the nominal cedi-dollar rate in 1973 was due 
to the devaluation of the US dollar to which the cedi was fixed. 
In the five-year plan for the period 1975/76 to 1979/80, the use of the 
exchange rate as a policy instrument was dismissed because policy-makers did nol 
consider the conditions in the Ghanaian economy suitable for a successful 
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devaluation (Republic of Ghana, 1977, p. 40). Preference was instead towards the 
use of variable purchase taxes, selective import duties and ad valorem licence 
levies to achieve the required changes in the exchange rate for imports. It was also 
stated within the same document that the currency was to be pegged to a basket 
of currencies. However, the cedi was not pegged to a basket of currencies, but 
devalued in 1978. At the time of the devaluation it was mentioned that a flexible 
exchange rate policy would be pursued. However, the policy of flexible exchange 
rates was only implemented for three months. Having dismissed frequent 
devaluations as a policy instrument, the government had to resort to fiscal and 
quantitative controls to influence trade flows. 
All through the period of controls, the wedge between the parallel and official 
exchange rate widened. The parallel market premium increased considerably, 
particularly in the latter half of the period (Table 1). 
Table 1 Nominal and real exchange rates 
Nominal Real Ratio of parallel 
Year (cedis/US$) 1980=100 to official rate 
1970 1.02 27.73 1.60 
1971* 1.818 28.03 0.96 
1972* 1.28 21.84 1.28 
1973 1.149 25.43 1.29 
1974 1.149 27.07 1.50 
1975 1.149 30.37 1.73 
1976 1.149 46.20 2.53 
1977 1.149 89.57 8.00 
1978* 2.75 101.73 5.93 
1979 2.75 75.44 5.67 
1980 2.75 100.00 5 .77 
1981 2.75 221.48 9.54 
1982 2.75 277.67 22.42 
*The year in which the official exchange rate was changed. In both 1971 and 1978 the 
devaluation occurred in the last quarter of the year. A decrease indicates depreciation. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook. Black market rates obtained from 
Stryker, 1990, p. 279
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Quantitative restrictions and exchange controls 
Quantitative restrictions were implemented through the issue of import licences 
which were not auctioned or resaleable. There were three types of licences: the 
Open General Licence (OGL) allowed registered importers to import freely the 
item specified on the licence; the Specific Licence required prior authorization 
before the goods were brought in; the Special Un-numbered Licence (later 
renamed the Special Licence), allowed imports to be brought in by importers who 
had access to their own foreign exchange. 
As a result of the liberalization of the import trade regime, by 1970 almost half 
of the import items could be brought in using the OGL. However, by February 
1972, most of the items were transferred to the Specific Licence lists and about 
150 items were either restricted or banned. This list increased to 170 in 1973, and 
by the end of 1974 the OGL could only be used to import trade samples, gifts and 
personal effects. Items on the restricted list were not normally imported. The basic 
items on this list, for example rice and sugar, could only be imported by the 
Logistics Committee. Imports of government organizations were to be made 
through the Ghana Supply Commission. 
The banning of items was a common practice during most of the period. Apart 
from balance of payments considerations, banning was implemented primarily as 
a protective measure. In some instances the banning order was issued without 
prior investigation into the possible effects of such a measure. For example, in 
August 1975 the importation of all textiles and textile goods was prohibited. In 
October of the same year a notice to importers was released stating that 
importation of textiles was to be limited only to industrial raw materials used by 
local industries registered with the Ministry of Industries. 
Import programming was prominent during this period. In most cases the 
planned import levels were less than desired. The import programme which was 
introduced in 1972 provided for C235 million in imports for that year. This 
implied reductions for some categories of about 50% of their 1970 import levels. 
In 1975, the Import Advisory Committee of the Ministry of Trade and Tourism 
projected a minimum import requirement of C900 million. At the same time the 
operational programme which had been drawn up on the basis of available foreign 
exchange provided for C535 million. The non-priority areas were allocated 
between 45% and 75% of their projected requirements. 
Import licences were to be allocated on the basis of the programme which had 
been drawn up. However, Table 2 shows that in most cases the value of import 
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licences which were issued were always greater than planned import values, and 
the value of actual imports exceeded those planned.1 
Table 2 Import licences issued and letters of credit established 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Initial programme 
for licences 554 .0 1126.0 1600.0 2432 .0 1702.1 
Actual import 
licences issued 978 .4 1969.9 2349 .7 3392.1 1938.9 
Letters of credit 
established* 865.4 1083.0 1183.0 1478.0 1058.2 
Approval of goods 
on collection basis 52 .0 166.0 542 .0 332 .4 683.2 
Sum of items (3) 
and (4)* at 31 Dec. 917 .4 1249.1 1725.0 1810.4 1751.4 
* excluding cancellations 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1981; Economic Survey 1977-80, December, Accra; 
Economic Survey 1981, August 1983. 
The failure of the import licensing system to issue licences within limits 
prescribed by the programme created a great deal of uncertainty. For example, the 
value of import licences was reduced in 1973; the face value of import licences 
for which no letter of credit was established was reduced by half in 1974, and in 
1975 import licences were revoked. The difficulty in obtaining spare parts by the 
manufacturing sector in 1975 reduced the ability to maintain production levels. As 
a result of this the import licensing system was relaxed in 1976. This may explain 
the substantial overshooting of the import programme in that year. 
The special unnumbered licences had a chequered history. They were 
abolished in 1974, re-introduced in 1975, and their use restricted in 1977. They 
were completely withdrawn in 1978 but re-introduced in 1980 as the Special 
Licence. Their use was restricted to the importation of food items, soaps, 
detergents, agricultural implements, raw materials for approved industries, 
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educational materials, motor spare parts, newsprint and printing machines, hospital 
equipment and pharmaceuticals. The disadvantage of the frequent changes in the 
use of this category of licence is that it made planning hazardous for economic 
agents who may have been using these licences to import their required inputs. 
The removal of these licences served to tighten import controls. It reduced the 
availability of foreign exchange for the finance of imports. It also implied that 
prospective importers were forced to go through time-consuming bureaucratic 
procedures which were being used to screen imports. 
In the 1973-74 budget, government recognized that the reduction in import 
values in 1972 had been due mainly to the import controls which had been 
introduced in that year. It was not, however, the intention to depend on import 
controls to achieve balance of payments objectives. It was to be done through the 
encouragement of exports, particularly non-traditional exports. The role of direct 
controls was to restructure imports to conform to economic policy, i.e. to achieve 
among other things the protection of domestic industry. In the five-year plan for 
the period 1975/76 to 1979/80, this roie of direct controls was reiterated. Despite 
these assertions direct controls were resorted to increasingly for balance of 
payments purposes because of the failure of government to pursue appropriate 
macroeconomic and exchange rate policies to tackle the balance of payments 
problem. 
By 1977 it was recognized that the strict import control system contributed to 
the economic problems facing the manufacturing sector. It was therefore decided 
that restrictions on the importation of raw materials and spare parts for some of 
the large enterprises within defined industries would be lifted. The industries 
identified to benefit from the liberalization scheme were food processing, poultry, 
beverages, soaps and detergents, textiles agricultural machinery and implements, 
pharmaceuticals, transportation and household goods. Enterprises which were to 
benefit from this scheme were mentioned specifically in the budget statement of 
1977/78. Other named enterprises within these industries would be eligible for a 
lifting of the restrictions within limits agreed upon with the Ministry of Finance. 
It was anticipated that the increase in production resulting from the reduction of 
the import constraint would contribute to the reduction of inflationary tendencies 
in the domestic economy. It was recognized that the liberalization of the import 
trade regime could have adverse effects on the balance of trade. The affected 
industries were therefore required to increase exports in order to reduce the 
possibility of the worsening balance of trade (Ministry of Finance, 1977, pp. 17-
19). 
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Exchange controls which had been in operation prior to 1972 were maintained 
and operated hand in hand with the import licensing system to control the use of 
foreign exchange. All invisible payments had to be approved by the Exchange 
Control Department of the Bank of Ghana. Export proceeds had to be collected 
and repatriated to Ghana within 60 days of shipment. The export proceeds in 
foreign exchange had to be deposited with the commercial banks. 
Restrictions were put on the amount of foreign exchange which residents could 
take abroad. In 1973 the basic allocation of foreign exchange for tourist and 
business travel was suspended. It was not re-introduced until 1978 and then 
removed again in 1979. In 1973 residents travelling abroad were allowed to take 
out the equivalent of C236.5 in foreign exchange. The allowance was reduced to 
CI00 in 1974 and remained at that level until 1979 when it was increased to 
C160. Non-residents were allowed to take out the equivalent of monies which they 
had brought in and which had not been spent. 
Taxes on foreign trade 
Several changes were experienced in the pricing instrument used to influence the 
quantity and structure of imports during this period. Table 3 provides information 
on the announced tax schedules for the various tax instruments used. 
There was a restructuring of the tariff system in the 1972-73 budget to 
introduce a system which would encourage domestic manufacturing and enable a 
more effective control of the import trade. This was insufficient to solve the 
problem of inadequate revenue generation because the issue was re-addressed in 
the 1973/74 budget. The projected revenues in the previous year's budget had not 
been met, and this was attributed to the wide differences in the rate of duties (e.g., 
import duty rates ranged from 5% to 150% in 1972) within commodity groups. 
This made tax evasion through the misclassification of imports easy. The 1973/74 
budget streamlined the tax schedule by merging the sales tax and import duties 
anil by narrowing the tax range (Table 3). The import licence levy remained. This 
was in order to make up for the estimated revenue loss due to the decline in the 
tax rates of some commodities. 
Separate targets were created for direct controls and the tariffs. The former was 
to he responsible for influencing the structure and quantity of imports, and the 
lattcr's main objective was to generate revenue. As a result of the narrowing of 
the tariff range the effective rate of duty collection improved slightly in 1973-74 
to 23% compared with 21% in 1972-73 (Ministry of Finance, 1975, p. 4). The tax 
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schedules were therefore maintained in the 1974-75 budget, the only significant 
change being the increase in the import licence levy on textile imports from 30% 
to 50%. This was mainly a protective measure to compensate textile manufacturers 
for the increase in the prices of raw materials, especially raw cotton. In the 
1975/76 budget statement, the customs duty and import licence levy on selected 
items was adjusted upwards as a revenue-generating measure. It was estimated that 
the increase in rates would increase revenue from duties by C6.21 million, thus 
contributing to closing the anticipated budget deficit gap (Ministry of Finance 
1975, p. 23). 
Tab le 3 Tax schedules 1972-82 
Import 
duties % 
Sales 
tax % 
Import Special 
licence levy % tax % 
1972 5 -150 11.5 7.5 on 
finished 
goods 
1974 20-50 unified 
with the 
import 
duty 
5 ,10,20,30 
1975 
1976 
1977 
20-50 
20-50 
0 for 
5 -150 
10 
abolished 
agricultural 
1979 
1980 
1981 
inputs 
35,60 
0,35,60 
0,35,60 10 
20 35,60 ,100 20 
Source : Budget statements for the respective years. 
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However, the problem of not being able to achieve import revenue objectives 
remained. In 1975, the effective duty collection rate had declined. Another 
restructuring of the import tariff schedules took place in the 1977-78 budget in 
order to rectify this. The import licence levy was abolished and the import duty 
schedule consisted of two rates, i.e. 35% for all tax categories which were 
previously below 60%, and 60% for all tax categories which were previously 
above 60%. It was hoped that this would reduce misclassification of commodities 
and that it would also reduce the ability of tax collecting agencies to impose 
discretionary rates. Apart from changes in the tax schedules, the budget also 
changed the import licensing procedures. Another reason for failure to achieve 
revenue objectives was the problem of ad hoc exemptions, whereby importers who 
were not liable to pay tax may have been able to transfer this benefit clandestinely 
to others. 
Apart from the frequent change in tax structures on an annual basis, there also 
were frequent changes among commodity categories as the tax rates for certain 
commodities were upgraded during the course of the year or vice versa. Table 4 
provides information on the average (unweighted) tax rates for imports. The data 
shows that this rate was consistently lower than the average suggested by the tax 
schedules. Between 1974 and 1980 this average rate remained lower than the 
average for the period 1972-73. 
To obtain an idea of the effect of the tax structure of the system of incentives, 
the bias in the trade regime was calculated. It may be measured as the ratio of the 
effective exchange rate of exports to the effective exchange rate of imports. The 
effective exchange rate of exports (EERx) is the amount of domestic currency the 
exporters receive as a result of earning a unit of foreign exchange. It takes into 
account any taxes and/or subsidies which exporters pay or receive. The effective 
exchange rate for imports (EERm) is the amount of domestic currency that has to 
be paid in order to obtain imports worth one unit of foreign exchange. Therefore, 
EERx = Ex (1 + s - tx) 
and EERm = Ex (1 + tm + q + P) 
where 
Ex is the nominal official exchange rate for exporters 
Em is the nominal official exchange rate for importers 
s is any trade subsidy going to the export sector 
tx is export tax 
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q is the import surcharge 
P is the premium due to the quantitative restrictions (i.e. import quotas) 
A value less than one implies there is a bias against export activities. A value 
greater than or equal to one implies a bias in favour of export activities. An 
important omission in the calculation of the bias in the trade regime from the 
information provided in Tables 4 and 5 was the import premium. The premium 
may be measured as the ratio of the difference between the domestic price and the 
border price (inclusive of tariff) to the border price (inclusive of tariff). However, 
the information on domestic prices presented in the wholesale price index will not 
give an accurate measure of the premium since they are not market prices. Prices 
during this period were subject to price controls so that officially recorded prices 
may underestimate the size of the premium. Another measure would be the black 
market premium. This however is subject to some errors since the size of the 
premium may be influenced by criminal activities, for example, drug trafficking. 
The estimates of the bias in the trade regime in Table 6 therefore underestimate 
considerably the extent of the bias due to the omission of this variable. For the 
years for which adequate information on price measures facing traded goods is 
available the effect of these measures has been to create an anti-export bias. 
Table 4 Price distortions facing total imports 
Year Tariffs* Purchase tax Sales tax Total rate EERm 
1970 17.02 0.91 7.82 25.75 1.28 
1971 18.57 1.39 7.41 27.37 1.31 
1972 14.70 1.70 
1973 18.05 0.76 
1974 11.98 0.76 - 12.74 1.29 
1975 10.21 1.29 - 11.50 1.28 
1976 11.65 1.17 - 12.82 1.29 
1977 12.61 N/A -
1978 18.29 N/A -
1979 16.98 0.44 - 17.42 3.22 
1980 12.78 0.12 - 12.90 3.10 
1981 18.20 0.61 - 18.81 3.26 
1982 19.42 0.78 2.75 22.95 3.381 
Note: 'Includes surcharge and special development levy; N/A not available in calendar years. Between 19/4 and 
1981 the sales tax was consolidated in the import tax. 
Source: Statistical Services, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, various issues, Accra. 
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Table 5 Price distortions facing taxed exports 
1 7 
C o c o a Non-cocoa Total exports 
Year Tax rate EER Tax rate E E R Tax rate EER 
1970 5 2 . 2 8 0 . 4 9 0 . 4 0 0 . 6 2 4 4 2 . 7 1 0 . 6 2 4 
1971 6 1 . 4 6 0 . 3 9 6 0 . 4 5 1 . 0 2 3 3 3 . 7 4 0 . 6 8 1 
1972 4 0 . 9 9 0 . 7 1 8 0 . 3 5 1 . 3 1 4 2 1 . 1 6 1 . 0 3 9 
1973 2 6 . 4 4 0 . 8 5 6 0 . 9 4 1 . 1 5 3 1 2 . 9 8 1 . 0 1 3 
1974 3 8 . 0 2 0 . 7 1 2 2 . 2 7 1 . 1 2 3 2 0 . 9 4 0 . 9 0 9 
1975 5 6 . 1 7 0 . 5 0 4 1 . 8 5 1 . 1 2 8 3 4 . 1 2 0 . 7 5 7 
1980 3 2 . 7 4 1 . 8 4 9 0 . 0 8 2 . 7 4 8 2 0 . 2 0 2 . 1 9 
1981 3 9 . 6 3 1 . 6 6 0 . 2 9 2 . 7 4 2 1 6 . 3 5 2 . 3 0 
1982 0 . 1 9 2 . 7 4 5 0 . 1 0 3 2 . 7 4 7 
Financing of trade 
Refundable cash margin deposits were re-introduced in 1974 and remained until 
1981 when they were abolished. These cash deposits were to be deposited in a 
special account with the Bank of Ghana before a letter of credit would be opened. 
The deposits were refunded when the bills were submitted for payment. 
Table 6 Estimates of the bias in the trade regime 
Year Bias 
1 9 7 4 
1 9 7 5 
1 9 7 6 
1 9 7 9 
1 9 8 0 
1 9 8 1 
1 9 8 2 
0 . 7 0 1 
0 . 5 9 0 
0 . 7 4 8 
0 . 2 8 5 
0 . 7 0 5 
0 . 7 0 4 
0.812 
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The structure of the cash deposits scheme favoured non-consumer goods as against 
consumer goods (Table 7). Particular items, for example, fertilizers and crude oil 
did not require prior cash deposit. 
Table 7 Cash deposit requirements (%) 
1974 1975 1977 1980 
Industrial raw 
materials, 
spare parts 
Machinery and 
equipment 
Lubricants 
Fertilizers 
Others 
50 
75 
75, 0 
for crude 
oil 
0 
100 
25 
50 
0, 50 
0 
65 
25 
50, 20 
for timber 
industry 
0, 25, 50 
0 
65 
25 
50, 20 
0, 25, 50 
0 
65 
Credit availability was also used as a measure to regulate imports. The import 
sector was defined as a non-priority area, and on occasion directives were sent out 
limiting the credit which was to be allocated to the import sector. For example, 
in 1975 it was stipulated that bank lending to finance imports was not to exceed 
a stated level. 
There was a decline in the share of commercial bank credit going to finance 
the import trade during this period. From 1979, credit going to finance exports 
exceeded that going to finance imports by a significant margin. 
In another attempt to restrict imports, the rate at which credit was lent out to 
finance imports was higher than that charged to exporters between 1978/79 and 
1980/81, i.e. 18% as against 13%. 
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Table 8 Commercial bank loans and advances (end of period, C millions) 
Year Import trade Export trade Total loans 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
32.4 (20.75) 
36.0 (12.69) 
53.1 (13.71) 
33.9 ( 8.61) 
31 .7 ( 6 . 2 8 ) 
25.6 ( 3.69) 
46.1 ( 4.91) 
30.0 ( 2.97) 
25.5 ( 1.68) 
40.2 ( 2 . 0 1 ) 
37.0 ( 1.64) 
19.2 (12.29) 
18.6 ( 6 . 5 5 ) 
16.0 ( 4 . 1 3 ) 
19.1 ( 4.85) 
21.0 ( 4 . 1 6 ) 
26.2 ( 3.77) 
23.8 ( 2.53) 
40.0 ( 3.96) 
260.8 (17.18) 
336.7 (16.83) 
249.4 (11.75) 
156.1 
283.6 
387.1 
393.6 
504.1 
693.4 
938.4 
1009.0 
1517.2 
1999.6 
2251.8 
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentage shares. Export trade figures exclude cocoa 
financing. 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, December 1988 and 
June 1989. 
Moves towards l iberal izat ion, 1983-86 
By 1982 import volumes, real government revenue and cocoa export volumes 
were at their lowest levels since the 1960s. Most economic variables had negative 
growth rates and the economy was facing a severe foreign exchange crisis. 
Between 1972 and 1982 merchandise exports contributed on average 69% to total 
gross foreign exchange inflows. For part of the 1970s the contribution was as high 
as 85%. The decline in the growth of export values and the dependence on foreign 
exchange earnings from merchandise exports for a significant proportion of 
foreign exchange inflows in the 1970s meant that the capacity to import had 
declined over the period 1972-82. The domestic manufacturing sector is highly 
import-dependent with most sectors depending on imported raw materials for a 
significant proportion of total requirements. Shortages in required raw materials, 
spare parts and capital goods were identified as being important determinants of 
excess capacity in the manufacturing sector (MDPI, 1974). The problem was not 
limited to the manufacturing sector. The cocoa sector, for example, was adversely 
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affected by the inadequate supplies of insecticides, pesticides and spraying cans 
(Nyanteng, 1980). The alleviation of the stranglehold which the import shortages 
had on the Ghanaian economy could only occur if there were an improvement in 
the performance of the export sector and an increase in external financial inflows. 
In order for there to be such an improvement, it was necessary that the incentive 
structure for exports in particular be improved. Theoretical analysis has shown that 
export sector activities are affected by policy towards imports (Clements and 
Sjaastad, 1984). Econometric evidence available shows that approximately 74-85% 
of import taxes in Ghana are shifted to the export sector (Jebuni et al. (1992). 
The estimates of the incidence parameter for Nigeria (Oyejide, 1986) and Zaire 
(Tshibaka, 1986) show similar magnitudes. A restrictive import trade regime with 
an anti-export bias will only serve to discourage export production. There was, 
therefore, a need to liberalize the trade regime and remove the anti-export bins. 
The import liberalization process which began in 1983 was part of a broad 
macroeconomic programme, the objective of which was to reverse the declinc in 
major economic indicators and to deal with the severe foreign exchange crisis 
which was facing the economy. 
Exchange rate policy 
The move towards import liberalization began in April 1983 with the sharp 
devaluation of the effective exchange rate. The exchange rate changes brought 
about significant changes in the real exchange rate. A devaluation can result in the 
liberalization of the trade regime if it absorbs the import premium of the import 
licences. The devaluation will also reduce the anti-export bias if the domestic price 
of importables does not increase. This will happen if the effect of the devaluation 
is to absorb the import premium, and if the devaluation is accompanied with 
inflows of external finance which allow an increase in import volumes (Kruegcr, 
1978, pp. 93, 100). The liberalization process will be sustained the greater the 
depreciation of the real exchange rates as a result of the nominal devaluation. 
In April 1983 a multiple exchange rate system was introduced. The nominal 
exchange rate remained fixed at its 1978 level, but a system of bonuses and 
surcharges was introduced which increased the actual exchange rate. As a result 
of the system of surcharges and bonuses, traditional exports and imports of crude 
oil, essential raw materials, basic foodstuffs and capital goods were subject to an 
actual rate of C23.75 to one US$. Non-traditional exports and other imports faced 
a rate of C25.975/USS. 
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Table 9 Nominal and real effective exchange rates 1983-86 (C/US$) 
2 1 
Nominal 
( C / U S $ ) 
Real effective 
rate 1980=100 
Ratio of 
parallel to 
official rate 
April 1983 
October 1983 
December 1984 
December 1985 
January 1986 
2.75 
30 .00 
50 .00 
60.00 
90.00 
242.99 
72 .27 
52 .23 
30 .54 
22.2 
3 .2 
2.8 
1.8 
Note: A decrease indicates depreciation. Real effective exchange rate obtained from IMF 
files. 
Source: Ratio of parallel to official rate obtained from World Bank, 1989, Ghana: Structural 
Adjustment for Growth, Report No. 7515-GH. 
The exchange rate was unified in October 1983 at C30 to one US$. Three 
nominal devaluations took place in 1984 and 1985 respectively (Table 9). The 
currency was devalued again in January 1986. A multiple exchange rate system 
based on an auction system (Window II) and a fixed exchange rate (Window I) 
was introduced in September 1986. The objective of the new system was to allow 
the exchange rate to be determined by domestic demand and supply factors, 
promote trade liberalization and divert foreign exchange held outside the banks 
into the banking system. The rate at the first window was the prevailing official 
rate which had been set in January of that year. The rate at the second window 
was determined by weekly foreign exchange auctions held by the Bank of Ghana. 
In the first auction that was held the marginal pricing system was used. In 
subsequent auctions the Dutch pricing system has been used whereby individuals 
purchase the foreign exchange at their bid price. In order to participate in the 
auction system prospective users of foreign exchange need to obtain a foreign 
exchange bid application form from the commercial banks for a fee and then 
provide a pro-forma invoice and a tax clearance certificate. 
The nominal devaluations made a significant depreciation of the real exchange 
rate, thus enhancing the possibility that the liberalization process would remain on 
course. The devaluations were also accompanied by a reduction in the gap 
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between the official rate and the parallel market rate (Table 9). The frequent 
changes in the rate during the three-year period beginning from October 1983 
would have contributed to generating confidence that the liberalization programme 
would be maintained. 
Qu antitative restrictions 
Import programming was maintained until 1986. The import programme and 
foreign exchange budget were formulated within the broad policy objectives of the 
Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), one of which was to "increase the overall 
availability of foreign exchange in the country, improve its allocation mechanism 
and channel it into selected high priority activities" (Republic of Ghana, 1983, p. 
16). The objective of the 1984 foreign exchange budget in particular was to 
allocate foreign exchange to activities which satisfied the following criteria: 
• improve the infrastructure of the economy so as to contribute to an increase in 
production, distribution and imports; 
• contribute to higher government revenues and reduce the budget deficit; 
• increase the supply of consumer goods. 
In order to improve the import programming procedures so that the situation 
of oversupply of import licences would not occur, an Import Programming and 
Monitoring Committee was set up. The members of the committee were to be the 
Secretaries of Finance and Economic Planning, Industries, Agriculture, Trade and 
Health. The co-ordinating secretary was the chairman of the committee. The 
committee's prime concerns were: 
• drawing up the annual programme; 
• examining and approving allocations made by the ministries to ensure effective 
use of maximum benefit from the licences issued; 
scheduling the submission of letters of credit applications and monitoring their 
establishment so that priority sectors would have first access to the available 
foreign exchange; 
• undertaking periodic reviews of the import programme within the context of 
possible changes in domestic and external conditions. 
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The import programme drawn up for the years 1983-85 allocated the largest 
share of the funds to transport and energy (Table 10). This was in line with the 
objective of the ERP which was to improve the infrastructure and incentives 
(including non-price) so as to encourage production and improve distribution. The 
programmes were drawn up on the basis of projected foreign exchange 
availability. External donors and organizations have played a significant role in the 
moves towards liberalization. The bulk of the finance of the import programme 
was expected to come from external sources (Table 11). 
Table 10 Import programme 1983-85 (US$) 
1983 1984 1985 
Sector Amount % Amount % Amount % 
Export 211 19.18 186 19.91 
Cocoa 41.01 4.13 39 4.17 
Mining 27.71 2.79 93 9.95 
Forestry 43.23 4.35 49 5.24 
Non-traditional 5 0.53 
agriculture 67 6.09 41.0 4.13 84 8.99 
Food 65 5.90 76.58 7.71 78 8.35 
Health 50 4.54 16.63 1.67 9 0.96 
Transport 350 31.81 110.85 11.16 85.7 9.17 
Energy 297.71 29.99 280.0 29.97 
Crude oil 211.0 22.59 
Other 69.0 7.38 
Education 20 1.81 11.08 1.16 9.0 0.96 
Manufacturing 151 13.72 91.41 9.21 123.0 13.16 
Construction 45 4.09 27.71 2.79 54.0 5.78 
Work & housing 20 2.14 
Roads & highways 34 3.64 
Water & sewerage 11.08 1.16 18 1.92 
Essential 
consumer goods 19.40 1.95 
Others 141 12.81 10 1.07 
Total 110 815.4 934 
Source: PNDC Budget Statements, 1983, p. 21; 1984, p. 42; 1985, p. 27. 
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Table 11 Foreign exchange availability by source (US$) 
Year 
Foreign 
Amount % 
Domestic 
Amount % 
1984 553.1 64.92 298.8 35.07 
1985 589.9 63.0 344.3 37 
1986 76 24 
1988 583.5 60.6 380.4 39.4 
Source: PNDC Budget Statements, 1984. 
The import licensing system which was in operation prior to 1983 was 
maintained until 1986 when the new exchange rate system was introduced. There 
was a redefinition of import licence categories, with three types in operation. The 
first was the "A" licence which allowed the holder to bid for foreign exchange at 
the Bank of Ghana auction. Items which could be imported using this category of 
licence were pharmaceutical goods, raw materials, spare parts and other producer 
goods. The second was the "S" licence which was similar to the previous Special 
Licence. Holders of this could not bid for foreign exchange at the Bank of Ghana 
auction, and licences were valid for six months. The third was the "G" licence 
which was issued to government organizations for the importation of essential 
goods and services. It was allocated to the ministries which submitted licences to 
the Ministry of Trade and Tourism. The "G" licence allowed government 
organizations to use foreign exchange without making recourse to the auction. 
Taxes on foreign trade 
The tax schedules were adjusted downwards in 1983 with the introduction of 
bonuses and surcharges. The net effect though was to increase the effective 
exchange rates of both imports and exports. The tax structure remained stable over 
the period 1983-85 (Table 12). The major significant change in the structure of 
taxes between 1983 and 1985 was the 50% tax on special licences. In 1986 there 
was a decline of between 5 and 10 percentage points in the tax rates for all import 
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categories except luxury goods. A licence tax of 0.1% was levied on the "A" 
licence. Holders of the "S" licence were required to pay a 20% advance income 
tax; however, importers of agriculture-related items were exempt from paying this 
tax. 
Table 12 Import tax schedules (%) 
1983 1984 1985 1986 
Import duties 
Concessionary 10-20 10-20 20-25 10-20 
Basic raw materials 25 25 25 10 
Other raw materials 30 30 30 20 
Capital goods 30 30 30 20 
Consumer goods 30 30 30 25 
Luxury items 30 30 30 30 
Import sales tax 
Concessionary 10-15 10 
Basic consumer goods 20 10 
Luxury goods 70 20 
Special development tax 
Special licences 10 20 50 50 
Import licence fee 
Special licence* 20 20 20 20 
"A" licence 0.1 
Note: 'advance income tax 
Source: National Revenue Secretariat, Accra. 
In 1986 an escalating tariff structure was established with raw materials and 
capital goods having a lower import tariff rate than consumer goods and luxury 
goods; the effect of this therefore being to increase the effective rate of protection 
of the domestic import substituting (consumer goods) industries compared to the 
previous period. 
Krueger (1978) identifies conditions which are necessary to ensure a successful 
devaluation. These are favourable conditions in the world market for the major 
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export commodity, a favourable crop harvest, favourable terms of trade and low 
inflationary tendencies. Other variables of relevance are the availability of inputs 
and domestic credits, the state of the marketing network and infrastructure. T h e s e 
are important in explaining the supply response to relative price changes brought 
about by the devaluation. These initial conditions did not exist at the time G h a n a 
embarked on the liberalization of trade regime. Despite this the devaluation of the 
real exchange rate was maintained. 
In an analysis of the conditions which contribute to a successful transition from 
exchange controls, based on evidence from ten country studies, Krueger states: 
The lesson would appear to be that transition ... can best be achieved by 
adopting a sliding peg at a realistic rate and simultaneously borrowing a 
quantity of foreign exchange sufficient to permit an immediate 
liberalization of imports (to the extent that the premium on import licences 
disappears) (1978, p. 241). 
A recent study of trade liberalization programmes in 19 countries found that 
in all but one of the liberalization programmes which was sustained a depreciation 
of the real exchange rate formed a significant component of the package. It was 
also found that most programmes which were sustained began with a substantial 
devaluation of the currency. Thus, timing of the devaluation was important 
(Papageorgiou et al., 1990).2 
The description provided above of the steps taken to liberalize the trade regime 
in Ghana between 1983 and 1986 indicates that by the end of 1986 conditions 
existed which could sustain the liberalization process. However, some reservations 
may be expressed concerning the role played by foreign finance. This is because 
if the external flows are debt-creating, they leave the recipients with a future debt 
obligation. The success of a liberalization process in which foreign borrowing 
forms an integral component depends on whether the liberalization will bring 
along with it increases in real income growth rates and export earnings. The 
inflow of external finance may avoid a recession in the economy as liberalization 
occurs (Papageorgiou et al., 1990, p. 240); however, it is not certain that future 
growth can be guaranteed. 
Liberal izat ion, 1986 to present 
The liberalization process was pursued further in 1987 with the conclusion of the 
fixed exchange rate policy. This was brought about with the closure of the first 
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window at the Bank of Ghana. Henceforth, all transactions had to take place at the 
Bank of Ghana auction. When the two-window system was in operation, foreign 
currency earnings from the export of cocoa and residual oil were transacted at the 
first window. 
In March 1987, service and transfer payments approved by the exchange 
control authorities could purchase foreign exchange at the auction. In the same 
year approximately 70% of the goods which had previously not been on the "A" 
licence list were transferred to that list from the "S" licence, and so were eligible 
to purchase foreign exchange at the auction. 
Several significant changes took place in 1988. The first was the introduction 
of the forex bureaux. The bureaux could sell foreign exchange freely to importers 
and other users of foreign exchange and could purchase foreign exchange from 
non-traditional exporters and recipients of remittances from abroad. The exchange 
rate was determined by the demand and supply of foreign exchange. With the 
introduction of the forex bureaux there were two "market determined" official 
exchange rates. 
Table 13 Nominal and real effective exchange rates 1987-90 (period averages, 
C/US$) 
Year Nominal rate REER 
1987 162.37 25.2 
1988 202.35 22.2 
1989 270.00 19.9 
1990 326.33 17.7 
Source: Statistical Services, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, March 1991, Accra; World Bank. 
The second change was the relaxation of the exchange control regulations. 
Residents could take out a maximum of US$3,000. Third, the liberalization of 
access to the Bank of Ghana foreign exchange auction was continued further when 
the remaining holders of the "S" licence who were previously excluded were 
eligible to bid for foreign exchange at the auction. 
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In January 1989, the import licensing system was removed. This was because 
"recent economic measures like the foreign exchange auction and the 
establishment of forex bureaux no longer justify the continued operation of the 
import licensing system" (Dr K. Botchwey in 1989 Budget Statement). With the 
end of the import licensing system, the exchange rate and international trade taxes 
became the major instruments used in the implementation of trade policy. 
The tax schedules were adjusted upwards in 1987 but reduced in 1988, so that 
they were below the rates prevailing prior to 1986 (Table 14). The escalating tariff 
structure was maintained. The basis on which the sales tax was calculated was 
adjusted in the 1988 budget. It was formerly calculated as a percentage of the CIF 
value. The new method calculated the sales tax as a percentage of the CIF value 
plus the import duty value. Second, both domestic and imported items were made 
subject to the same sales tax rate. 
Table 14 Import tariff schedules 1987-90 
1987 1988 1989 1990 
Import duties 
Concessionary 10-25 
Basic raw materials 15 
Other raw materials 20 
Capital goods 25 
Consumer goods 35 
Luxury items 30 
Import sales tax 
Concessionary 10-20 
Basic consumer goods 35 
Luxury goods 45 
Special development tax 
Special licences 50 
Import licence fee 
Special licence 20 
"A" licence 0.5 
10-25 10 10 
10 10 10 
15 15 10 
15 15 10 
20 20 20 
25 25 25 
10 10 10 
25 22.5 22.5 
35 35 35 
50 0 0 
20 0 0 
0.5 0 0 
Source: Statistical Services. 
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With the removal of the import licensing system in 1989, the cost of importing 
w a s reduced for most items because of the elimination of the Special Development 
Tax and import licence fees. The tax rates on other raw materials and capital 
goods were reduced in 1990, thus contributing to increasing further the effective 
rate of protection of the consumer goods industry. 
In order to protect selected industries, duty protection rates of 10-40% were to 
be imposed on the following items: textiles; alcoholic and non-alcoholic 
beverages; tobacco; rubber and plastic products; pharmaceuticals, especially anti-
malarials and analgesics; toiletries and cosmetics; soaps and detergents; garments, 
especially children's clothes; and food preservation, processing and canning. At 
the same time, the special tax levied on local production of textiles, alcoholic and 
non-alcoholic drinks was made applicable to the imports of these items. 
Estimates of the bias in the trade regime indicate that there has been some 
decline in the anti-export bias since 1983. This has been due to a decline in the 
export tax rate which has been greater than the decline in the import tariffs. 
Because of the difficulty in calculating the import premia during the period of 
controls, the extent of the reduction in the anti-export bias during the present 
liberalized trade regime compared with the period of controls has been 
underestimated. 
Table 15 Estimates of the bias in the trade 
regime 1983-91 
Year Bias 
1983 0.608 
1984 0.680 
1985 0.637 
1986 0.718 
1987 0.726 
1988 0.775 
1989 0.777 
1990 0.779 
1991 0.835 
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By 1990 Ghana's import trade regime had changed dramatically from what ft 
had been in the 1960s when import controls were first introduced, and in 1972 
when they were re-introduced. There was a floating exchange rate regime, the first 
since the post-independence period, import licensing was abolished, the import 
tariff schedules were reduced dramatically and restrictions on the outflow of 
foreign exchange were relaxed substantially. 
One study showed that all trade liberalization programmes which had not been 
sustained had failed to relax quantitative restrictions. The authors concluded that 
"radical reform of the QRs seems to be all but a necessary condition for the 
success of trade reform" (Papageorgiou et al., 1990, p. 17). Thus, Ghana's trade 
liberalization programme has the major ingredients necessary for success and 
sustainability. Though these may be necessary, they might not be sufficient 
conditions since a lot also depends on external influences, for example, terms of 
trade and growth in the major economies. Other important aspects include the 
Economic Recovery Programme, credit policy and the social impact of the entire 
programme. 
The present liberalization phase differs from the previous one (1967-71) in four 
major respects: 
1. Time period covered by the liberalization programme; 
2. Continuous depreciation of the real exchange rate because of frequent nominal 
devaluations; 
3. Ability to achieve a complete liberalization of imports with the complete 
removal of the import licensing system; 
4. Accompanying fiscal and monetary policies which are more restrained in the 
present liberalization phase. 
Although restrictive fiscal and monetary policies preceded the import 
liberalization in the previous liberalization episode, constraints on the growth of 
government expenditures were not maintained during the entire period. In the 
present period, the growth of government expenditures has been declining since 
1985, thus a fairly cautious fiscal policy had been pursued during a greater part 
of the period. 
Ill Trade and payments regime a n d 
balance of payments3 
Trade l iberal izat ion 
Theoretical discussions will lead one to believe that the effect of a trade 
liberalization programme on the balance of payments depends on the content of 
the liberalization programme, the relative responsiveness of exports and imports 
to any changes in the incentive structure, the accompanying macroeconomic 
policies, public perception of the liberalization programme and the initial 
economic condition (Bevan et al., 1987; Rodrik, 1990; Papageorgiou et al., 1990; 
Krueger, 1978). 
There is no unambiguous definition of what is meant by trade liberalization 
(see Edwards, 1989, for a discussion of this). Most economists will accept as a 
minimum criterion the definition provided by Krueger (1986) which is that a 
liberalized regime constitutes a shift from the use of quantitative restrictions to the 
use of price instruments. In fact according to this definition a tariffication of the 
QRs would constitute a liberalization. This is a second best liberalization. A 
broader definition of trade liberalization requires the removal of QRs and a 
reduction in import tariff rates. This is a move towards free trade. A third 
conceptual distinction may be made in terms of moves towards neutrality. This 
represents an increase in export incentives with given inports protection.4 
If it is possible to calculate and substitute the tariff equivalent of the import 
premium going to import licence-holders whilst keeping the value of imports 
constant, the resultant effect is that there will be no change in the domestic price 
of imports. Relative prices (i.e. the price of tradables relative to non-tradables) 
will not change so that the export sector is not expected to respond to the 
liberalization of the import trade regime. The effect of tariffication of the quota 
transfers revenue from the private sector to government. Thus income, i.e. the rent 
going to the quota-holders, will decline. If part of this rent were spent on imports, 
then private sector imports would decline. Whether or not the entire quota is 
utilized depends on the government's marginal propensity to import. 
If, instead of using tariffs, a devaluation is undertaken which maintains a 
constant value of the import quota, the devaluation will transfer some of the 
import premia to government, the size of this depending upon the extent of the 
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devaluation. If the devaluation is not sufficient to erode the entire import premia, 
then the domestic price of imports is unlikely to increase. It is likely that imports 
from the private sector will decline as real incomes fall due to a transfer to the 
government sector. The devaluation will change relative prices in the domestic 
economy. The effect on the trade account will depend on the price responsiveness 
of the export sector. 
Thus, if a "narrow" liberalization programme is pursued, the use of a 
devaluation is more likely to contribute to an improvement in the trade balance 
than is the use of tariffs because of the relative price effects. 
If the liberalization programme is pursued by increasing import volumes, the 
increase, ceteris paribus, will be accompanied by a decline in the level of 
domestic import prices as the excess demand is reduced. The reduction in import 
tariffs at the same time as restrictions on imports are being removed will be 
accompanied by a further decline in the domestic price of imports, encouraging, 
in turn, a further inflow of imports. The decline in the price of importables will 
cause an increase in relative prices and encourage a positive export supply 
response to the extent of dependence on the relative price change and the price 
responsiveness of the export sector. The trade balance position will be determined 
by the relative responsiveness of the exportables and importables sectors to the 
relative price changes. 
A devaluation combined with removal of quantitative restrictions will increase 
the border price of imports and reduce the potential for decline in the domestic 
price of importables. The responsiveness of exports to the relative price change 
is crucial in alleviating the worsening of the trade balance due to liberalization. 
It is expected that export sector responses to liberalization of the trade regime 
will be slower than the import demand response. The export supply response will 
depend on several factors. The existence of excess capacity and the degree of 
obsolescence of the machinery etc. are important in determining supply response. 
The larger the excess capacity, the greater the potential for a significant export 
response. Obsolete machinery which needs replacing will constrain the supply 
response. The availability of credit, especially working capital, is also important. 
The need to replace obsolete capital may increase the demand for credit by the 
export sector, and if this is not made available, it will constrain export supply. 
Bevan et al. (1987) have noted that if supply of consumer goods and imported 
inputs to the export sector is not increased when there is a relative price change, 
the export sector may not generate the expected positive supply response, if a 
shortage of these goods acts as a constraint on production. Fourth, if there is 
uncertainty regarding whether or not there will be a policy reversal, it is possible 
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that trade liberalization will discourage rather than encourage exports. This is 
because potential exporters take into account the cost of moving in and out of a 
sector which is experiencing a change in incentives towards it. Uncertainty can 
also increase the demand for imports in the short run over and above what they 
should be. Individuals will increase purchases of imports if they expect that the 
liberalization phase will be reversed in the near future. The effect of this 
uncertainty causes the trade balance to worsen significantly, thus putting pressure 
oil the authorities to reverse the policy (Rodrik, 1990). 
Foreign investors would also wish to ensure that the liberalization programme 
as well as the macroeconomic package accompanying it will remain in place 
before investing resources in the economy. Thus, private long-term capital flows 
in particular may be slow to respond to the liberalization process. In fact, if there 
is a relaxation of exchange controls at the same time, the net effect may be an 
outflow of capital as individuals not certain whether the policy will be maintained 
will take advantage of the relaxation of controls. The most likely source of major 
capital inflow will therefore be from official sources in the short to medium term. 
This is especially so if the liberalization package were drawn up after consultation 
with the World Bank and IMF. It is necessary, within the context of economies 
that are liberalizing from a system of controls which has meant shortages of 
essential input requirements, to have adequate external financial resources to 
encourage the production of exportables as well as importables. 
The responsiveness of both import demand and export supply to a liberalization 
programme will be determined also by the macroeconomic context within which 
the programme is introduced. Expansionary fiscal policy which increases domestic 
expenditures will encourage an increase in imports. If the policy results in 
increases in the money supply, this will contribute to fuelling inflation, thus 
causing the real exchange rate to appreciate (if there has been a once-and-for-all 
nominal devaluation). The appreciation of the real exchange rate will cause import 
demand to increase and export supply to decrease, thus causing the trade balance 
to deteriorate. If expansionary fiscal policy occurs when the narrow definition of 
liberalization is being pursued, excess demand will not be expressed by an inflow 
of imports but by an increase in domestic prices. The resulting inflation will 
reduce the competitiveness of the export sector and so reduce the incentive to 
export. It is necessary that macro-policy be pursued such that it regulates demand 
for imports to the capacity to import. Fiscal and monetary restraint are therefore 
necessary. However, in imposing monetary restraint it is necessary that the 
demand for credit from the export sector not be unduly constrained. This is 
because if the devaluation is associated with an increase in the price of imported 
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inputs, there may be an increase in the demand for working capital in order to pre-
finance the production process. 
It is difficult to determine a priori what effect a trade liberalization programme 
will have on the balance of payments. If the liberalization is introduced when the 
current account is in deficit, it is almost certain that in the short run this deficit 
will widen because of the relatively slow response of the export sector to 
incentives as well as the need to increase the supply of imports in order to 
generate the required supply response from the export sector. In the medium to 
long term, however, as the programme is sustained, if the liberalization is 
accompanied by an explicit export promotion policy (and assuming international 
demand conditions do not deteriorate), the trade balance and current account 
position may improve. Whether or not the current account will go into surplus will 
depend upon whether the trade surplus will be large enough to finance the debt 
service on past loans which were incurred to finance and sustain the liberalization 
programme. 
T h e cont ro l led reg ime 
Strict imports may result in a trade balance surplus being obtained; however, it 
will be at the cost of a decline in the openness of the economy if the effect of the 
controls is to discourage the export sector. As the export sector declines, controls 
on imports will be strengthened in order to maintain the trade surplus, and this 
will further reduce the incentive to export. Where the economy is import-
dependent, this will reduce the growth of GDP. 
The overvalued exchange rate and exchange controls, which are usually features 
of a controlled regime, will discourage foreign direct investments and other capital 
inflows. This is likely to occur if the foreign exchange constraint becomes binding 
and economic agents realize that the currency programme of controls is not 
sustainable. A general characteristic of the structure of Ghana's balance of 
payments is that traditionally Ghana has always had a deficit on its services 
account. The changes in the current account position are determined primarily by 
the trade balance position and net official transfers. 
Ghana has gone through two episodes of controlled regime, 1961-66 and 1972-
82. During the two periods, virtually the same methods were used to regulate the 
flow of imports. An examination of the tables below shows that developments in 
the external account, however, differed for each of the time periods. 
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During periods of substantial smuggling characteristic of controlled regimes, 
official figures will not reflect total activity in the economy. Both official import 
and export values will be lower than the actual. However, if the non-official trade 
is balanced, since it has to finance itself, the official figures may still provide 
some indication of the overall effect of the regime. 
In the first controlled trade regime episode of 1961-66, export volumes declined 
in three out of the six years (Figure 2). The sharp increase in volumes in 1965 
was due to the very large cocoa harvest that year. Non-cocoa export performance 
was also poor during that period. The real exchange rate appreciated in the face 
of a fixed nominal exchange rate and rising prices, eroding export incentives. 
During this period there was no deliberate policy to encourage exports which 
could have counteracted the negative effect of the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. 
Figure 2 Export and import volumes indices (1985=100) 
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The major focus of trade policy was the control of and change in the structure 
of imports. Import volumes in the three years after the introduction of controls 
managed to stay below their 1961 levels (Figure 2). However, there was difficulty 
in staying within planned import levels because of the pressures of demand 
(Killick, 1978, p. 269). The expansionary fiscal policies pursued during the period 
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were at odds with the objective of correcting the balance of payments 
disequilibrium. The large current account deficit of 1965 was due to the 
substantial increase in import values due largely to the rise in import volumes to 
accommodate the OAU conference (Table 16). Although cocoa export prices had 
declined significantly in that year, this was compensated for by the substantial 
increase in cocoa exports. Total export values, therefore, were hardly affected. The 
overall balance of payments however, was in surplus because of the substantial 
inflow of short-term capital in that year. These flows were not maintained in iho 
following year so that there was a large balance of payments deficit in 1966. Even 
though the controls were able to improve the trade balance position, this was at 
the cost of a declining external sector. Given the import-dependent nature of ihe 
manufacturing sector in the Ghanaian economy, this did not portend well lor 
manufacturing output in particular and overall growth in general. Between 1961 
and 1966 the ratio of exports to GNP declined from 20.24% to 12.69% whilst the 
ratio of imports to GNP declined from 25.5% to 15.02%. 
In the second controlled regime of 1972-82, in spite of fluctuations, the general 
trend was downward for both export and import volumes (Figure 2). Apart from 
the introduction of aluminium exports from AIco in 1967, there was very liitle 
diversification of the commodity structure of exports. An export promotion 
package was introduced in the 1973 budget and again in the 1978 budget, 't he 
promotion package was not adequate to reverse the effect of the overvalued 
exchange rate on the incentive to export. Utilization of export incentives involved 
having to overcome several bureaucratic hurdles which increased the cost to 
exporters. The import control system still in place contributed in no small pari to 
these bureaucratic bottlenecks. The declining import volumes, which mean i a 
decline in the supply of wage goods and imported inputs required by the export 
sector, further discouraged export production. Severe shortages of both 
domestically-produced goods and imports were experienced in the 1970s, and 
there was a need to set up special outlets to ration the supply of what was referred 
to at the time as "essential goods". Supplies of insecticides and spraying cans, for 
example, did not meet minimum requirements. Therefore, despite the existence of 
subsidies on inputs used in the cocoa industry, production declined and the quality 
of the tree stock deteriorated because the lack of adequate supply rendered the 
input subsidy ineffective. The declining real producer price relative to Ghana's 
neighbours also encouraged a diversion of exports to unofficial channels. The 
export sector therefore shrank further during this second period of controls i'rom 
20.36% of GNP in 1972 to 10.48% in 1977 and 3.32% in 1982. 
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T a b i c 1 6 B a l a n c e of p a y m e n t s in the contro l led r e g i m e (mil l ions U S $ ) 1 9 6 0 - 6 6 
1 9 6 0 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 6 
Export 
values F.O.B. 333 .8 332 .5 319 .9 307 .0 321 .4 321 .2 280 .3 
Import 
values F.O.B. 348.1 384 .7 310.1 336 .6 321 .5 439 .4 320 .7 
Trade balance -14.3 -52 .2 9.8 -29 .6 -0.1 -118 .2 -40 .4 
Current account -47 .9 -103.5 -33 .7 -80.1 -55 .4 -222 .9 -127 .8 
F.D.I. 3 .9 -11 .3 9.9 7 .4 14.5 38 .2 56.1 
Long-term 
capital flows 104.1 97.6 40 .4 55 .4 42 .6 45 .6 46 .6 
Short-term 
capital -11.1 -0 .2 -4 .4 -11 .5 -8 .8 144.5 -25 .0 
Overall balance 25 .7 -21 .8 4.1 -40 .8 -4 .2 15.2 -48.1 
Reserves 272 .2 150.3 176.1 203 .7 119.9 110.2 105.5 
Cocoa export 
volumes 
1985=100 202 271 281 2 7 0 255 319 262 
Cocoa beans 
price US 
cents/lb 
1985=100 26 .2 20 .9 19.7 24.1 22.1 16.8 22 .7 
Despite the decline of the export base for the reasons outlined above, the trade 
balance was in surplus in all but two of the years during this period (Figure 3). 
The import control system was successful in constraining merchandise imports to 
the growth rate of merchandise export values. However, this meant that since the 
export sector was declining (due to the adverse impact of the policies of the 
controlled regime), the import base had to decline if a trade surplus were to be 
achieved. Thus, the ratio of imports to GNP declined from 13.47% in 1972 to 
10.06% in 1977 and 2.5% in 1982. The decline in the import base is evident from 
Figure 2. The generally favourable terms of trade between 1972 and 1979 may 
explain why the trade balance was in surplus despite the faster fall in export 
volumes compared with import volumes. 
A current account surplus was achieved in five out of the 11 years in which the 
controlled regime was in place (Table 17). The services account was always in 
deficit, with the size of the deficit increasing almost continuously during the 
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period. Net private current transfers were in deficit except for 1975. Positive net 
official transfers reduced the size of the current account deficit. In two of the five 
years in which a surplus was achieved (1975 and 1980), this was because of the 
positive net official transfers. The current account surplus of 1972 was due to the 
sharp decline in import volumes which pushed import values down. The surplus 
in 1973 may be explained primarily by the increase in export values and the 
improved terms of trade in that year. During the period, however, there was a 
slow-down in the inflow of capital. The disbursement of long-term loans declined 
in 1973 and only began to increase again in 1975. The loan inflows were 
significantly lower than the levels obtained in 1961-66. This difference may be 
explained by the unilateral repudiation of some external loans in 1974. Thus, the 
overall balance of payments surplus experienced in some years was due more to 
the trade balance surplus in those years than to capital inflows. This situation was 
not sustainable given the low export and import base and the constraints within 
the domestic economy because of the insufficient supply of imports. 
Figure 3 Balance of trade 
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Table 17 Balance of paymen ts in t he cont ro l led reg ime, 1972-82 (mi l l ions(JS$) 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Exports fob 334 .6 384.3 585 679 801 779 889.6 892.8 1065.7 1103.6 710.7 607.0 
Imports fob 368 .2 222.9 372.1 708.2 650.5 690.3 860.2 780.3 803.1 908.3 954.3 588 .7 
Trade balance -33 .6 161.4 212.9 -29.2 150.4 88.8 29.4 112.5 262.6 195.3 -242.6 18,3 
Services (net) -112.5 -66.5 -98.7 -166.4 -177.4 -189 .7 -167 .6 -219.4 -245.7 -260.2 -209.4 
CA Balance before 
official transfers -154.9 92.1 107.9 -199.3 -2 .7 -105.1 -144.4 40.6 -53 .7 -508.0 -192.3 
Net official transfers 9.0 16.2 18.8 27.8 20.3 31.0 64.6 81.4 82.9 87.2 83 .7 
Current account -145.8 108.2 126.7 -171.5 17.0 -74.0 -79.7 -45.9 122 29.2 -420.8 -108.6 
FDl 30 .6 11.5 14.4 10.5 70.9 -18.3 19.2 9 .7 -2.8 15.6 16.3 2.4 
LTCF (net) 34.4 29 .7 17.0 -2.0 21.6 4.9 69 .7 83 .9 54 .2 19.6 77.1 111.8 
Disbursements* 37.9 41.5 32.1 31.1 31.1 44.8 100.4 79.4 98.1 81.3 58.2 
C T C F 32 .2 -121 .8 -40.5 34.6 -10.0 -23.1 -30.0 25 .7 -31.7 5.8 14.7 3.6 
Overall balance 34 .7 33.1 109.1 -142 .0 106.3 137.3 -8.5 -46 .0 35.6 -30.1 -288.7 9.6 
International reserves 36.1 93 .7 176.1 71.5 124.7 91 .7 148.6 277 .2 289.1 180.4 145.6 138.9 
Cocoa volumes (1985=100) 2 1 6 263 295 2 0 5 193 196 151 128 113 154 109 134 
Cocoa value U S cents/lb 
(1985=100) 23.8 28.3 56.4 88.9 64.0 102.9 198.1 156.5 146.8 117.6 94.0 79.3 
LTCF = long-term capital flows; S T C F = short-term capital flows; * = long-term loans 
Sources: IMF IFS Yearbook, 1990; IMF BOP Statistics, Vol. 41, No. 11, November 1990; World Bank, Trends in Developing 
Countries, 1990. 
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period. Net private current transfers were in deficit except for 1975. Positive net 
official transfers reduced the size of the current account deficit. In two of the five 
years in which a surplus was achieved (1975 and 1980), this was because of the 
positive net official transfers. The current account surplus of 1972 was due to the 
sharp decline in import volumes which pushed import values down. The surplus 
in 1973 may be explained primarily by the increase in export values and the 
improved terms of trade in that year. During the period, however, there was a 
slow-down i n the inflow of capital. The disbursement of long-term loans d e c l i n e d 
in 1973 and only began to increase again in 1975. The loan inflows were 
significantly lower than the levels obtained in 1961-66. This difference may be 
explained by the unilateral repudiation of some external loans in 1974. Thus, the 
overall balance of payments surplus experienced in some years was due more to 
the trade balance surplus in those years than to capital inflows. This situation was 
not sustainable given the low export and import base and the constraints within 
the domestic economy because of the insufficient supply of imports. 
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Table 17 Balance of paymen ts in t he cont ro l led reg ime, 1972-82 (mi l l ions(JS$) 
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Imports fob 368 .2 222.9 372.1 708.2 650.5 690.3 860.2 780.3 803.1 908.3 954.3 588 .7 
Trade balance -33 .6 161.4 212.9 -29.2 150.4 88.8 29.4 112.5 262.6 195.3 -242.6 18,3 
Services (net) -112.5 -66.5 -98.7 -166.4 -177.4 -189 .7 -167 .6 -219.4 -245.7 -260.2 -209.4 
CA Balance before 
official transfers -154.9 92.1 107.9 -199.3 -2 .7 -105.1 -144.4 40.6 -53 .7 -508.0 -192.3 
Net official transfers 9.0 16.2 18.8 27.8 20.3 31.0 64.6 81.4 82.9 87.2 83 .7 
Current account -145.8 108.2 126.7 -171.5 17.0 -74.0 -79.7 -45.9 122 29.2 -420.8 -108.6 
FDl 30 .6 11.5 14.4 10.5 70.9 -18.3 19.2 9 .7 -2.8 15.6 16.3 2.4 
LTCF (net) 34.4 29 .7 17.0 -2.0 21.6 4.9 69 .7 83 .9 54 .2 19.6 77.1 111.8 
Disbursements* 37.9 41.5 32.1 31.1 31.1 44.8 100.4 79.4 98.1 81.3 58.2 
C T C F 32 .2 -121 .8 -40.5 34.6 -10.0 -23.1 -30.0 25 .7 -31.7 5.8 14.7 3.6 
Overall balance 34 .7 33.1 109.1 -142 .0 106.3 137.3 -8.5 -46 .0 35.6 -30.1 -288.7 9.6 
International reserves 36.1 93 .7 176.1 71.5 124.7 91 .7 148.6 277 .2 289.1 180.4 145.6 138.9 
Cocoa volumes (1985=100) 2 1 6 263 295 2 0 5 193 196 151 128 113 154 109 134 
Cocoa value U S cents/lb 
(1985=100) 23.8 28.3 56.4 88.9 64.0 102.9 198.1 156.5 146.8 117.6 94.0 79.3 
LTCF = long-term capital flows; S T C F = short-term capital flows; * = long-term loans 
Sources: IMF IFS Yearbook, 1990; IMF BOP Statistics, Vol. 41, No. 11, November 1990; World Bank, Trends in Developing 
Countries, 1990. 
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The devaluation of 1978 was not accompanied by restraint in expenditures. The 
decline in import volumes may be explained more by the binding constraint of the 
import licensing on import demand. The increase in export values between 1978 
and 1980 can be explained by the export price changes during that period. The 
increase in the producer price of cocoa in that year suggested that there was a full 
pass-through of the devaluation to the cocoa farmers. However, the devaluation 
was not enough to reverse the decline in the real producer price of cocoa. Import 
volumes declined at the same time, suggesting that the import constraint on the 
export sector was still binding. The trade surplus of the year of the devaluation 
and the following year was the result of the effectiveness of the import control 
system rather than due to a positive supply response to the devaluation. Export 
values did not change significantly. Volumes were actually lower in 1978 anil 
1979 compared to 1977. 
There was a sharp drop in cocoa prices in 1981, not long after the doubling of 
oil prices in 1979-80. Cocoa volumes also declined in that year. Total export 
values declined sharply. Import volumes increased at the same time, causing the 
trade balance to go into deficit. International reserves which had been declining 
since 1979 declined further still so that in 1981 they covered less than three 
months of imports. 
The further decline in cocoa prices in 1982 despite the increase in export 
volumes caused values to decline. Import volumes were severely constrained so 
that a trade surplus was achieved. Despite the trade balance surplus, a large deficit 
in the service account existed, and there was a fall in net official transfers, thus 
maintaining the current account deficit. However, capital inflows were insufficient 
to finance the current account deficit. International reserves declined further. 
Government expenditures increased almost continuously during this period. 
Despite the rising rate of inflation, the level of real domestic absorption declined 
in 1972, increased in 1973-74 and remained above its 1972 level for most of the 
period. In most cases a greater proportion of the increase in real absorption was 
due to increases in government consumption. The expansionary fiscal policy of the 
government would have worsened the trade balance if the import control system 
had not been in place. As a result of the control system, excess demand expressed 
itself in increases in the prices of goods in the domestic market as well as through 
the import of items through unofficial channels. 
By the end of the ten-year period the size of the overall balance of payments 
deficit was small in nominal terms compared with the previous period of 
liberalization and the trade balance was in surplus. However, the shrinking size 
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0l iiie external account and its adverse implications on output, government 
,vv' <iues and inflation meant that a change in policy was definitely required. 
There is no clear-cut relationship between the trade balance and the controlled 
res'.ii ne (Figure 3). In the first period, the trade balance was, on average, in deficit, 
while in the second period it was in surplus. The difference could be explained 
lan." ly by the terms of trade. In both instances there was a failure to improve 
export performance. The appreciation of the real exchange rate during this period 
is an important explanatory variable. This is evident from Figure 4 which maps 
the real exchange rate and export volumes. The poor performance of the export 
seei'.ir in both periods suggests that the situation was not sustainable since foreign 
exchange availability was not improving. 
Flrjnre 4 Exports volume and real effective exchange 
1970 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 
Years 
Liberal ized reg ime 
During the first liberalization phase, the government had pursued deflationary 
fiscal and monetary policies and devalued the exchange rate before a liberalization 
of the import trade regime began. The devaluation was passed through fully to the 
exporters through increases in the producer prices in those cases where these 
prices were determined administratively. On the import side, the devaluation was 
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accompanied by a price increase of about 55% of the gross devaluation during t]le 
succeeding six months (Leith, 1974, p. 118). 
The liberalization of the trade regime began in 1968 with an increase in a 
number of goods which could enter using the OGL. There was a sharp increase 
in import volumes in 1968; hereafter, they declined in 1969, rose in 1970 and fell 
in 1971 (Figure 2). Nominal import values between 1967 and 1969 actually 
remained below their values during the period of controls. Real domestic 
absorption increased continuously after 1968, and the real exchange rate was 
eroded by inflation. The fact that import volumes did not increase substantially 
would suggest that the import licensing system still in place was important in 
explaining the movement in import volumes. 
The performance of the export sector did not improve during this period. There 
was a significant downward trend in export volumes (see Figure 2). Export values, 
however, increased due to increased cocoa prices between 1967 and 1969 (Table 
18). It has been suggested that the increase in producer prices following the 
devaluation was not enough to encourage new plantings which would encourage 
long-run supply (Leith, 1974). The real value of the nominal devaluation was 
eroded because of price increases in the domestic economy. In an analysis of the 
response of the non-cocoa sector to the devaluation it was found that there was 
a slower response than expected (Leith, 1974, p. 131). The incentive programme 
introduced in the 1969-70 budget was constrained by bureaucratic and 
implementation bottlenecks. The appreciation of the real exchange rate eroded the 
subsidy equivalent of the export promotion package. Given the inability to 
generate a surplus on the trade account, it would have been necessary to devalue 
the currency earlier than was indeed the case, i.e. before 1971. 
The failure of the liberalization programme was the failure to encourage a 
positive growth of exports. Import volumes could have been restrained further but 
this would have been at the expense of domestic growth. The continuous increase 
in real domestic absorption during this period suggests that greater fiscal and 
monetary restraint was required than actually prevailed (Leith, 1974; Ofori-Atta, 
1975). 
The objective of the present liberalization programme is to improve the external 
account position of the country as well as reduce the bottlenecks and constraints 
on output growth due to foreign exchange shortages. An expansion of both import 
and export programmes was thus the objective of the liberalization programme. 
There was a change in the effective exchange rate in April 1983 through the 
system of surcharges and bonuses. Although government expenditures increased 
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by 51%, the sharp increase in prices during this period caused real domestic 
absorption to decline. 
Tab le 1 8 B a l a n c e of p a y m e n t s in the l iberal ized t rade reg ime, l iberal izat ion 1 , 1 9 6 7 -
71 
1 9 6 5 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 7 1 9 6 8 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 1 
Export fob 321.2 280.3 284.2 304 .4 345.0 427 .0 334 .6 
Import fob 439.4 320.7 265.4 264.6 295.3 375.1 368.2 
Trade balance -118.2 -40.4 18.8 39 .8 49.7 51.9 -33.6 
Services (net) -117.9 -112.5 
C.A. balance 
before official 
transfers -76.0 -154.9 
Net official 
transfers 8.3 9.0 
Current account -222.9 -127.8 -84.9 -56.1 -60.1 67.7 -145.8 
F.D.I. 38 .2 56.1 32.5 15.8 10.2 67.8 30.6 
LTCF (net) 45.6 46.6 19.5 15.9 40.6 34.3 34 .4 
Long-term loan 
disbursements 41 .8 37 .9 
STCF (net) 144.5 -2.5 -44.1 16.6 16.4 -48.5 32.2 
Overall BOP 15.2 -48.1 -72.3 -6.5 -26.9 2 .5 -34 .7 
Reserves 110.2 105.5 77.1 90.3 66.2 36.6 36.1 
CCV 1985=100 319 262 220 2 2 0 204 242 216 
Cocoa beans 
price US 
cents/lb 
1935=100 16.8 22.7 29.82 34 .78 45 .22 33.26 25 .65 
Notes: C C V = c o c o a v o l u m e s ; F D I = fore ign direct investment ; L T C F = long- te rm capital 
flows (not including FD I ) ; S T C P = shor t - term capi ta l f lows 
Source: a s in T a b l e 16 
Import volumes increased continuously between 1983 and 1990 (Figure 2). 
This may be explained by the positive income growth rates experienced during the 
period as well as by the sizeable capital inflows in those years compared with 
previous years. Despite the large depreciation of the currency between 1983 and 
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1986, domestic prices did not increase by as much as the gross devaluation. This 
may be explained by the existence of the black market and the fact that most 
goods prices were determined by the black market rate. Although aggregate 
demand was increasing during that time, the positive increase in output also 
contributed to counteracting the effect of the devaluation on domestic prices. It is 
possible that without the maintenance of import licensing during this period, 
import demand would have increased further than it did. 
A significant proportion of the devaluation was passed through to the cocoa 
sector through increases in the producer price which were able to reverse the 
decline in real prices. Both cocoa and non-cocoa export volumes have taken some 
time to respond to the change in incentives associated with the liberalization 
programme (Figure 2). The sharp devaluations increased the price of imported 
inputs. The response to changes in price incentives by those activities which did 
not have excess capacity or modern machinery was constrained in the short-run. 
There would be a need for access to working capital to finance the increased cost 
of input and capital imports in order to respond to the devaluation. Credit to 
finance the export trade fell in 1983 and 1984 compared with their values in the 
early 1980s. It was not until 1985 that credit increased above the 1980 levels. 
Uncertainty as regards whether or not the liberalization programme would be 
reversed lengthened the decision and implementation lag of economic agents. 
Despite the initial sluggish response of the export sector, the growth of export 
volumes has picked up since 1987. 
Import volumes responded faster to the new set of incentives than did exports 
(Figure 2). Between 1983 and 1986 the devaluation reduced the differential 
between the official and parallel market exchange rates. Since most imports were 
priced at parallel market rates, the devaluation did not affect import prices 
significantly. Imports increased as pent-up excess demand for both consumer and 
producer goods was satisfied with the relaxation of quantitative restrictions. Figure 
1 indicates a slow-down in the rate of annual percentage change in import 
volumes since 1987. This may be because it is only since 1987 that the price 
effect of the devaluation has had an impact on import demand. Credit to finance 
the import trade increased significantly between 1983 and 1986 in both absolute 
and relative terms. There has been a slow-down in the growth of credit going to 
finance imports since 1987, and this may also be important in explaining the slow-
down in the growth of import volumes. The trade deficit during most of the period 
1983-89 may be explained by the decline in terms of trade and not necessarily 
because of a failure of export sector performance to improve. 
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The service account has been in deficit throughout the entire period. The size 
0f the current account deficit has been reduced substantially by net official 
transfers. In some years the effect of these transfers has been to reduce the size 
of the current account balance before official transfers by more than 50%, e.g. in 
1984 and between 1986 and 1988. The result is that the ratio of the current 
account balance after official transfers to GNP have declined since 1983 from 
5.12% to 2.05% in 1984. In 1988 it was estimated at 2.02%. Apart from grants, 
the programme has also experienced a substantial inflow of loans. The inflow of 
long-term loans almost doubled between 1983 and 1984 and doubled again 
between 1985 and 1986 (Table 19). The inflows of long and short-term capital 
have allowed the overall balance of payments to be in surplus despite the large 
current account deficits recorded (Table 19). The result has been substantially 
larger holdings of international reserves compared with what was available during 
the first liberalization phase. The liberalization programme, apart from 
encouraging inflows of loans from official sources (both bilateral and multilateral), 
lias also encouraged the inflow of private transfers by Ghanaians resident abroad. 
The first liberalization episode was characterized by an appreciating real 
exchange rate. This can explain its failure to stimulate exports in contrast with 
current liberalization which is characterized by a depreciating real exchange rate. 
Figure 4 illustrates rather dramatically the importance of the real exchange rate in 
explaining developments in export volumes. This has also been confirmed in 
econometric estimates of the relationship between the exchange rate and export 
performance (Jebuni, Sowa and Tutu, 1991). Export performance has improved 
significantly during the present phase compared with the previous. Differences in 
the initial conditions and the manner in which the liberalization has been pursued 
may also be important in explaining the differing export performance between the 
two liberalization episodes. In the present episode, liberalization was introduced 
when the economy was heavily distorted, probably more so than was the case in 
the former period. The high incidence of cocoa smuggling and the large gap 
between the parallel and official market rates (compared with the relatively 
smaller divergence in the period 1967-71) may be indicative of the extent of 
distortion in the economy in 1982. Thus, the export response (as recorded in 
official statistics) of the cocoa sector was definitely not entirely made up of 
production changes but also composed of a diversion of cocoa from unofficial to 
official channels as a result of the improvement in the real official price of cocoa. 
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T a b l e 1 9 Liberal izat ion P h a s e II, 1 9 8 3 - 8 9 
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1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 
Export FOB 607.0 439.1 565.9 632.4 773.4 820.8 881.0 807.2 
Import FOB 588.7 499.7 533.0 668.7 712.5 951.5 993.4 -999.0 
Trade balance 18.3 -60.6 32.9 -36.3 60.9 -124.7 -112.4 -191.8 
Services (net) -209.4 -185.9 -234.0 -240.0 -298.5 -297.0 
C.A. balance before 
official transfers -192.3 -248.3 -180.0 -243.7 -165.5 -220.1 -263.6 
Net official transfers 83.7 74.2 141.2 109.5 122.5 123.2 173.7 
Current account -108.6 -174.1 -38.8 -134.2 -43.0 -96.9 -65.8 -97.5 
F.D.I. 2.4 2.4 2.0 5.6 4.3 4.7 5 .0 15.0 
LTCF (net) 111.8 31.4 202.2 39.5 142.0 227.0 178.59 187.6 
Long-term loan 
disbursements 97.8 172.9 117.8 181.1 360.6 326.1 330.9 
S T C F (net) 3.6 93.3 2.7 39.8 -82.9 23.4 25.1 33.4 
Overall BOP -9.6 -172.9 35.6 14.1 -60.8 140.2 181.1 155.6 
Reserves 
minus gold 144.8 301.6 478.5 573.0 195.1 221.3 347.3 
C C V 1 9 8 5 = 1 0 0 134 104 91 100 128 130 132 162 
Cocoa beans price 
US cents/lb 
1985=100 79.3 94.2 107.6 100.0 91.8 87.0 
No tes : C C V = c o c o a vo lumes; F D I = foreign direct investment; L T C F = long- term capital 
f lows (not including FD I ) ; S T C P = short - term capital f lows. 
S o u r c e : as in T a b l e 16. 
However, in contrast to the period 1967-71 when the trade account was always 
in surplus, current liberalization has been characterized by the tendency for the 
trade balance to be in deficit. This could be explained, to a large extent, by the 
differences in external support. High levels of external support in the current 
programme have allowed the economy to maintain levels of imports substantially 
above exports. 
Both liberalization episodes have been associated with positive movements in 
import volumes. There has been a consistent increase in import volumes during 
the present programme compared with the previous one. Liberalization with or 
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without real depreciation of the currency tends to increase imports. This is because 
liberalization in both cases was preceded by a period of controls and excess 
demand within the domestic economy. 
Comparison of t rade regimes 
The different regimes cannot be differentiated on the basis of their effects on the 
trade balance position. The first liberalization episode improved the trade balance 
compared with the controlled period preceding it. The current episode is 
characterized by trade deficits in most years, compared with the trade surpluses 
of most years during the controlled trade regime preceding it. 
The controlled regimes have been able to constrain the growth of import flows 
but have not always been successful in achieving planned levels because of the 
failure to constrain aggregate demand effectively to achieve their objectives on the 
external account. 
Both regimes are characterized by a failure to encourage positive export growth 
rates. This has contributed to putting the controlled regime in jeopardy. However, 
the first liberalization episode did not reverse the downward trend in export 
volumes. This indicates that import liberalization on its own is not sufficient to 
encourage exports without a definite and effective export promotion policy as well 
as an exchange rate policy which prevents overvaluation of the currency. 
Commodi ty compos i t ion of impor ts 
The import control system has been used as a tool to obtain the government's 
objective of industrialization through import substitution. This was begun in the 
1960s through a deliberate change in the commodity structure of imports using the 
import licensing system. There was a significant decline in the share of consumer 
goods and an increase in the share of producer goods between 1961 and 1966. By 
1966 consumer goods imports were equivalent to 30.9% of total imports compared 
with 49.4% in 1961, while the share of producer goods rose from 46.4 to 64.8% 
in the same period. It is not clear to what extent this decline in consumer goods 
affected the supply of wage goods to the rural sector and so affected the incentive 
to produce cash crops for both the domestic and external market. 
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The liberalization of 1967-71 was not accompanied by a change in the structure 
of imports. This may be because the import licensing system was still in operation 
to achieve government policy objectives. 
The policy concerning the import structure was maintained during the second 
period of controls. The shift in the commodity composition of imports from 
consumer goods to producer goods which was begun in the 1960s was maintained 
in the 1970s. However, major determining factors of the commodity composition 
of imports during this period were the two oil price increases in the 1970s. 
Table 20 Commodity composition of imports by end-use 
Consumer Fuels and Producer 
Year goods lubricants goods 
1961 49.40 4.20 46.40 
1962 39.40 5.53 55.02 
1965 34.33 4.01 61.64 
1966 30.90 4.22 64.88 
1967 32.83 5.89 61.29 
1968 28.25 7.75 63.40 
1969 30.20 6.34 63.40 
1970 30.10 5.74 64.10 
1971 23.39 6.02 65.85 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey 
It had been projected in the five-year plan for the period 1975-80 that there 
would be a gradual decline in the share of consumer goods to about five 
percentage points below the 1975/76 shares by the end of the plan period (Table 
21). The share of fuels and lubricants was expected to decline by about one 
percentage point during the plan period. The decline in the share of consumer 
goods would allow for an increase in the share of producer goods in total imports. 
However, as the following discussion on actual commodity shares will show, the 
plan projections were not realized in their entirety. 
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Table 21 Composition of planned imports in the Five-Year Plan 1975-80 
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Consumer Fuels and Producer 
Year goods lubricants goods 
1975/76 23.1 17.1 59.8 
1976/77 23.1 16.7 60.2 
1977/78 21.7 16.4 61.9 
1978/79 20.1 16.3 63.6 
1979/80 18.1 16.1 65.8 
Source: Republic of Ghana, 1977, p.70 
The trend for the period 1972 to 1982 has been for fuels and lubricants to 
make up an increasing proportion of total imports (Table 22). The share of this 
item in total imports between 1977 and 1980 was significantly greater than what 
had been projected in the five-year plan. Until 1978 the increase in the share of 
petroleum products was primarily at the expense of imports of consumer goods 
(Table 22). In 1977 for example, the share of consumer goods declined to 13.95% 
of the total. The share of consumer goods remained fairly stable between 1972 and 
1975 except for a dip in 1974, the year the oil prices tripled. After 1975, the 
proportion of producer goods in total imports increased continuously until 1978 
when it declined by five percentage points. In 1976 and 1977 the share of 
producer goods was actually greater than what had been planned for that period. 
Both the share of fuel and lubricants and producer goods declined in 1978 
allowing a significant increase in the share of consumer goods. With the second 
oil price increase in 1979-80, however, the upward trend in the share of this 
commodity group declined significantly after 1978 (Table 22). Fuel and lubricants 
increased in importance with their share increasing to 35% in 1982. Consumer 
goods imports also gained at the expense of producer goods in the period 1980-82. 
In 1983 there was a sharp increase in the share of consumer goods imports into 
the economy compared with their 1982 shares. This was a continuation of the 
pattern which began in 1980. The increase in 1983 in the share of consumer goods 
imports can be explained by the increase in absolute values of imports of durable 
goods (not including private vehicles). Their share increased from 5% of consumer 
goods imports in 1982 to 15.63% in 1983. Interestingly enough the share of food 
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imports in consumer goods imports declined in that year. Petroleum imports share 
of total imports declined significantly in that year to 10% of the total. As a result 
of this, the share of producer goods imports increased considerably (Table 23). 
Table 22 Commodity composition of imports, 1972-82 
Consumer Fuels and Producer 
Year goods lubricants goods 
972 24.7 11.5 63.8 
973 27.9 8.8 63.2 
974 23.84 16.36 59.8 
975 20.3 16.6 63.1 
976 20.94 14.94 65.14 
977 13.95 18.67 68.18 
978 23.24 13.65 63.10 
979 18.11 20.61 61.20 
980 17.06 26.66 56.28 
981 20.5 30.59 48.8 
982 20.9 35.6 43.47 
Source: 1972-80 obtained from various issues of Economic Survey, 1980-82 supplied by 
the Statistical Services Department. 
During the transitional period of 1983-85 the pattern begun after 1979 
continued, i.e., there was a decline in the share of producer goods. This however, 
was reversed in 1986. The liberalization period of 1986-88 has been accompanied 
by a surge in the share of consumer goods.5 However, despite liberalization there 
has not been any significant change in the structure of imports, that is, producer-
goods still constitute the larger share of total imports. 
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Table 23 Commodity composition of imports 
Consumer Fuels and 
Year goods lubricants 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
29.72 
19.24 
25.49 
31.71 
40.60 
23.14 
10.11 
34.73 
29.2 
15.45 
13.99 
15.03 
Source: supplied by Ghana Statistical Services. 
Producer 
goods 
60.16 
46.01 
45.29 
52.84 
45.41 
61.83 
IV Liberalization and fiscal performance 
As discussed in an earlier section, one of the main considerations affecting 
exchange rate and trade policy in Ghana is the fiscal deficit. In recent works 
Greenaway and Milner (1993) and Rodrik (1990) have emphasized the revenue 
and therefore budgetary implications of the trade reform as crucial in ensuring its 
sustainability. It is argued that in view of the importance of trade taxes in 
developing countries, when trade reform is undertaken it should be implemented 
primarily with an eye towards alleviating the fiscal crisis. Fiscal deficit as used 
here is based on the conventional definition which measures the difference 
between total government cash outlays including interest outlays (but excluding 
amortization payments) and total cash receipts (including tax and non-tax revenue 
and grants but excluding borrowing proceeds). This definition is on a cash basis 
as distinct from the accrual concept.6 However, there is no analysis of the 
relationship between trade and payments regime and the fiscal deficit in Ghana. 
At the theoretical level liberalization can be expected to have important 
implications for government revenue, expenditure and the fiscal deficit. Theory 
suggests that the effect of the trade regime on the budget may depend on the 
direct impact on trade tax revenues and the economy's response to the changes in 
relative prices. Tanzi (1989) has provided an inventory of the positive and 
negative effects of trade liberalization with a devaluation on tax revenue. 
Liberalization with a devaluation may have a positive effect on tax revenues 
through: 
• the replacement of quotas and other quantitative restrictions by tariffs; 
• reduction of duties from the prohibitive to a more normal range; 
® putting low tariff on previously exempted goods (in a situation where exempted 
goods form a large share of imports perhaps due to import-substitution 
industrialization policy, this change is potentially very important in terms of 
revenue yield); 
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. increase in the value of imports and in the domestic prices of imported 
products because of the devaluation; 
, the likely reduction in smuggling; 
• some positive effects associated with a possible change in the composition of 
imports in favour of the decreased incentive to bias imports towards imports 
of raw materials and intermediate products; 
. some positive effects on tradable output, especially over the medium-run, 
associated with devaluation and the liberalization policy. 
Among the negative effects on tax revenue, Tanzi recognizes the possibility 
that, at least for some imported products, the continuation of price increases due 
to devaluation and price reductions due to the reduction in import duties may 
result in a reduction in tax revenue. Over the short-run trade liberalization with 
devaluation may reduce output and employment in some sectors (especially 
import-substituting sectors) enough to have a negative impact on tax revenue. On 
the whole, however, Tanzi argues that trade liberalization with devaluation would 
increase tax revenue and possibly improve the fiscal balance. However, as Cheasty 
(1990) argued, the extent of these effects will depend on the price elasticity of 
demand for imports, income-related effects, the elasticity of substitution among 
imports, the market structure of import trade, the public's perception of 
liberalization and the response of the economy. 
Empirical evidence from Africa and Latin America suggests that there is no 
clear cut relationship between trade taxes and trade reform (Greenaway and 
Milner, 1993). 
One of the main effects of a devaluation will be an increase in the domestic 
currency value of any external debt. This will contribute to an increase in 
government expenditures which may have adverse implications for the budget 
position. Additionally, in the presence of dual foreign exchange markets (i.e. 
official and parallel markets) additional expenditure-increasing channels may exist. 
Pinto (1989) has argued that there might be a trade-off between inflation and the 
black market premia. The black market premia might act as a means of taxation 
of the export sector. A devaluation narrowing the gap between the two may result 
in fiscal deficit as government expenditure increases if government is a net buyer 
of foreign exchange. This may also be inflationary as the government resorts to 
monetizing the deficit. 
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Struc ture of gove rnmen t revenue 
Throughout Ghana's post-independence history, except for 1981 and 1982, taxes 
on international transactions have been the most important source of government 
revenue. For the entire period between 1965 and 1980, taxes on international 
transactions have contributed on average over 40% of government revenues (Table 
24). The absolute importance of international transactions declined during the 
Economic Recovery Programme period 1984-89, even though they still remain as 
the topmost revenue earner for the government (Table 24). The period 1981-82 is 
the exception, marking the complete collapse of the economy. Tax revenue records 
for this period are also incomplete. Within taxes on international transactions, the 
relative importance of export and import taxes fluctuate. 
Table 24 Structure of government revenue, 1965-88 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Taxes on 
international 
transactions 0.45 0.39 0.40 0.42 0.45 0.55 0.52 0.43 0.36 0.44 0.53 0.37 
Export duties 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.24 0.30 0.36 0.27 0.29 0.20 0.27 0.35 0.22 
Import 0.38 0.32 0.26 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.25 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.15 
Taxes on 
domestic goods 
and services 0.22 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.23 0 .22 0.25 0.22 0.17 0.28 
Taxes on income 
and property 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.23 0.20 0.21 0.24 
Total tax 
revenue 0.88 0.89 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.87 0.84 0.86 0.90 0.88 
Non-tax 
revenue 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.12 
Grants 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
cn a> 
Table 24 cont ... 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Taxes on 
international 
transactions 0.40 0.36 0.61 0.44 0.28 0.18 0.49 0.38 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.35 
Export duties 0.24 0.21 0.48 0.31 0.07 0.05 0.30 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.26 0.17 
l m P ° r t 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.22 0.13 0.19 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.18 
Taxes on 
domestic goods 
andsetvices 0.31 0.29 0.16 0.28 0.39 0.36 0.17 0.26 0.22 0.31 0.26 0.25 
Taxes on income 
and property 0.20 0.21 0.14 0.21 0.25 0.33 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.28 
Total tax revenue 0.91 0.90 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.96 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.97 0.91 0.88 
Non-tax m 
revenue 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.13 0.09 0 11 5 
JO 0 
Grants 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.08 ^ 
> _ TJ ——— —— — —— m 
ro 
ro 1 
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Next in importance in terms of government revenues are taxes on domestic 
coods and services. They are then followed by taxes on income and property. 
Even though the ranking of grants from abroad in terms of contribution to 
government revenue has remained the same throughout the period, its percentage 
contribution has varied widely. From an insignificant contributor, it accounted for 
7.5% of government revenue in 1988. In the short to medium-term the structure 
0f government revenue, regarding the relative importance of various components, 
reflects the structural features of the economy. This for the Ghanaian economy 
reflects the dominant role of agriculture, the importance of cocoa taxes and taxes 
on imports. 
Most agriculture consists of smallholder farms and livestock farming which 
are not taxed. Cocoa, which is the largest single source of government revenue, 
contributes only 7.9% of GDP and 10% of agricultural output. Thus, about 40% 
of GDP originating from the non-cocoa agricultural sector is not taxed directly. 
This agricultural sector is also the least dependent on imports. 
Gove rnmen t revenues, expend i tu res a n d f iscal ba lance 
In July 1967, the currency was devalued and an austere budget introduced. In 
response, government tax revenue increased by almost 17% in 1967 and continued 
to increase until 1970. There were increases in most sources of government 
revenue. However, increases occurred to a large extent as a result of the increase 
in revenue from taxes on international transactions. For the period 1967 to 1970 
real revenue from international transactions increased by 23% in 1967, 13% in 
1968, 18% in 1969 and by 16% in 1970 (Tables 25 and 26). Most of the increase 
was due to increased revenue from export taxes on cocoa. Revenue from taxes on 
imports actually declined in 1967 and 1968 but picked up in 1969. In 1971, as a 
result of the continuing import liberalization, government revenue from taxes on 
imports increased by 26%. However, because of a substantial fall in world cocoa 
prices, revenue from cocoa export duties declined. As a result, overall government 
tax revenue declined by 5%. 
In response to the higher import prices consequent upon the devaluation, 
import volume decreased and, as a result, real revenue from taxes on imports 
declined by 2% in 1967 and 22.8% in 1968. However, with the import 
liberalization programme in 1969 and the appreciation of the real exchange rate, 
import values and revenues increased. Compared with a decline in real 
government tax revenue of 28% and 29% in real total revenue, both government 
tax revenue and total revenue increased continuously throughout the liberalization 
phase 1967 to 1970 as shown in Table 25. 
Table 25 P e r c e n t a g e c h a n g e s in g o v e r n m e n t revenue , 1 9 6 6 - 1 9 8 8 
Ol co 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Taxes on 
international 
transactions -0.38 0.23 0.13 
Export duties -0.32 1.43 0.81 
Import -0.39 -0.03 -0.23 
Taxes on 
domestic goods 
and services -0.17 0.17 0.01 
Taxes on income 
and property -0.19 0.07 0.06 
Total tax 
revenue -0.28 0.17 0.08 
Non-tax 
revenue -0.36 0.61 -0.04 
Grants 
GDP -0.10 0.10 0.02 
CPI 0.15 -0.10 0.11 
Total revenue -0.29 0.22 0.06 
0.18 
0.31 
0.00 
-0.04 
0.03 
0.08 
- 0 . 2 1 
0.10 
0.06 
0.05 
0.46 
0.55 
0.32 
0.10 
-0.03 
0.26 
0.43 
-0.51 
0.10 
0.03 
0.28 
-0 .11 
-0.30 
0.26 
0.11 
-0.07 
-0.05 
- 0 . 1 0 
0.01 
0.02 
0.09 
- 0 . 0 6 
- 0 . 2 0 
-0.32 
0.04 
0.09 
0.01 
0.12 
0.12 
- 1 . 0 0 
0.06 
0.17 
-0.05 
0.43 
0.56 
0.26 
0.03 
0.04 
0.01 
0.01 
0.12 
0.19 
0.18 
0.15 
0.25 
- 0 . 0 2 
-0.27 
- 0 . 0 2 
0.00 
- 0 . 2 8 
-0.85 
-0.13 
0.30 
-0.04 
-0.51 
-0.58 
-0.39 
0.15 
- 0 . 2 1 
- 0 . 1 8 
-0 .18 
-1 .00 
- 0 . 2 1 
0.55 
-0.31 
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Table 25 cont ... 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Taxes on 
international 
transactions -0.34 -0.22 0.93 -0.46 -0.68 -0.27 1.73 
Export duties -0.32 -0.38 1.73 -0.51 -0.89 -0.18 5.20 
Import -0.36 -0.24 0.05 -0.29 -0.14 -0.31 0.44 
Taxes on 
domestic goods 
and services -0.3 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.07 -0.52 
Taxes on income 
and property -0.48 -0.23 -0.19 0.06 -0.39 0.53 -0.48 
^revenue -0.56 -0.31 0.25 -0.24 -0.50 -0.09 0.05 
Non-tax ^ „ n o c 
revenue -0.56 -0.19 0.13 -0.28 -0.04 0.92 0.26 
G r a n t s - -0.98 -1.00 error -0.51 -0.11 -0.51 
G D P -0.21 0.09 -0.13 0.01 -0.22 -0.03 -0.04 
C P | 1.17 0.73 0.55 0.50 1.17 0.22 1.23 
Total revenue -0.39 -0.30 0.21 -0.24 -0.49 0.16 -0.004 0.53 
1984 
0.19 
0.16 
0.23 
1.28 
0.66 
0.51 
0.59 
10.48 
0.05 
0.40 
1985 
0.74 
0.68 
0.82 
0.36 
0.74 
0.62 
0.59 
0.61 
0.11 
0.10 
0.61 
1986 
0.38 
0.24 
0.57 
0.90 
0.52 
0.55 
-0.78 
0.92 
0.23 
0.25 
0.32 
1987 
0.19 
0.37 
- 0 . 0 1 
-0.03 
0.14 
0.11 
2.68 
0.12 
0.04 
0.40 
0.18 
1988 
0.16 
-0.31 
0.08 
0.02 
0.29 
0.003 
0.30 
0.46 
0.08 
0.31 
0.03 
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Table 26 Government revenue, 1965-1988 (millions of 1980 cedis) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
4738.67 
762.07 
3976.59 
Taxes on 
international 
transactions 
Export duties 
Import duties 
Taxes on 
domestic 
goods and 
services 
Taxes on income 
and property 2138.81 
Total tax 
2933.48 3607.11 
520.19 1263.76 
2413.29 2343.32 
2382.15 1960.55 2291.93 
1740.90 1862.89 
revenue 
Non-tax 
revenue 
Grants 
GDP 
CPI 
Total revenue 
9259.63 6634.94 7761.93 
1252.30 795.23 1277.46 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
54296 48968 53714 
2.70 3.10 2.80 
4076.52 4807.33 7033.41 6274.40 4382.93 3506.25 5021.05 5756.76 2776.52 
2283.87 2998.87 4637.50 3260.38 2914.63 1975.00 3089.47 3871.62 1631.30 
1808.77 1808.85 2384.91 3014.08 1468.29 1531.25 1931.58 1885.14 1145.22 
2318.77 2227.73 2450.76 2726.59 2219.57 2420.83 2496.49 1831.08 2100.87 
1978.65 2031.33 1977.85 1831.84 2178.05 2208.33 2303.51 2250.00 1778.26 
8373.96 9066.39 11451.03 10832.89 8780.49 8135.42 9821.05 9831.08 6655.65 
1228.35 969.70 1388.24 1245.95 1358.54 1527.08 1540.35 1110.81 907.83 
0.00 18.18 8.82 8.92 85.37 0.00 82.46 12.16 0.00 
54839 60576 66441 67595 68659 72958 81754 71392 56748 
3.10 3.30 3.40 3.70 4.10 4.80 5.70 7.40 11.50 
10139.02 966.5 11361.40 10941.89 7563.48 
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Table 26 c o n t . . . 9 z 
O — — . — - P 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 x 
O 
— — — x 
> 
Taxes on > 
international z 
transactions 1842.57 1246.17 2409.61 1303.60 417.37 306.65 838.45 998.26 1734.00 2392.82 2843.2 2392.88 rn 
Export duties 1110.44 387.47 1876.88 926.10 101.66 83.12 515.73 600.81 1008.95 1252.70 1718.13 1182.49 O 
Import duties 732.13 558.70 532.73 377.50 324.71 223.53 322.79 397.39 725.05 1140.12 1125.14 1210.39 O 
Taxes on -< 
domestic 
goods and 
services 1411.65 948.49 633.78 831.60 583.37 624.55 297.69 678.40 921.01 1753.64 1704.74 1746.05 
Taxes on income 
and property 925.30 707.89 575.23 611.30 370.81 567.33 293.14 487.03 847.43 1292.20 1477.73 1908.13 
Total tax 
revenue 4179.52 2902.55 3619.52 2746.50 1371.55 1498.53 1429.28 2163.69 3502.44 5438.66 6025.75 6047.07 
Non-tax 
revenue 402.41 327.38 284.38 203.40 122.26 235.06 269.53 472.84 753.53 165.10 606.95 791.29 
Grants 121.69 2.32 0.00 45.00 22.17 19.64 9.66 110.91 178.20 341.57 381.32 555.43 
G D P 44831 48691 42375 42853 33499 32647 31188 32831 36769 45158.00 47120 50859 
CPI 24.9 43.1 66.6 100.0 2216.5 264.8 590.0 824.1 909.1 1132.4 1583.2 2080.0 
Total revenue 4581 93 3229.93 3903.90 2949.90 1493.81 1733.57 1725.81 2636.54 4255.97 5603.76 6632.71 6838.37 
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Tax rates on imports declined during the period. The total tax rate on imports 
declined from 55.48% in 1966, to 47.29 in the second half of 1967. The decline 
continued to 36% in 1968, 32% in 1969 and rose slightly to 37.73% in 1970. The 
rate of taxation on exports also declined during the period. 
Receipts from exports expanded significantly during the period 1967 to 1971. 
The increase in export earnings was due to both an increase in export volumes and 
world market price of cocoa. This contributed to the substantial increases in 
receipts for export duties. In 1971, however, there was a 21.1% drop in export 
receipts. Import values also increased throughout the period. However, the 
reduction in taxation was higher than the increase in import values, resulting in 
a decline in receipts from import duties in 1967 and 1968. As a result, import 
surcharges were introduced in 1969. But this could not reverse the situation. In 
1970 a special development levy was imposed on imports followed by a service 
payments allocation tax in 1971. Revenues from taxes on domestic goods and 
services and on income and property also increased as GDP increased in real 
terms from 1968 to 1970. 
The period 1971-82 marked the collapse of liberalization and the re-
introduction and maintenance of strict controls. In 1971 real government revenues 
declined by 6%. With falling cocoa prices and pressure on imports, the 
government was forced to devalue the currency in December 1971. The new 
government revalued the currency in January but with a net devaluation of 28%. 
In spite of the devaluation and controls, real government tax revenue and total 
revenues declined in 1971, 1972 and 1973. Revenue from domestic taxes on 
production and expenditure as well as taxes on income and property increased. 
The decrease in government revenues was therefore due to the decline in revenues 
from taxes on international transactions, and this was in spite of the increase in 
general tax rates. 
Import volumes decreased as a result of the re-imposition of controls. Growth 
in exports slowed down. The structure of imports favouring producer goods and 
fuels and lubricants with lower levels of taxation was maintained, consistent with 
the import-substituting strategy. As a result, both the cocoa and import tax bases 
were eroded. The erosion of the tax base is evident in the decline in real GDP 
figures which began in 1975, three years after the controls were introduced, the 
decline in export volume and the increasing incidence of smuggling. 
In 1974 and 1975, as a result of a substantial increase in the world market price 
of cocoa, tax revenues from export duties increased by 56% and 15% respectively. 
Tax revenues from imports increased by 26% in 1974 and declined slightly by 2% 
in 1975. As a result, tax revenues on international transactions increased by 43% 
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jn 1974 and a further 15% in 1975, resulting in an overall increase in tax revenues 
of 21% in 1974. In 1975, in spite of the increase in taxes on international 
transactions, tax revenue on all other sectors decreased by 4%. This was as a 
result of a 28% decrease in non-tax revenues and an 85% decrease in budgetary 
grants from abroad. The year 1975 was a critical one in the economy of Ghana. 
While GDP increased at a modest rate throughout the period 1971 to 1974, in 
1975 real GDP decreased by 13%. From 1976, real government tax revenue and 
other revenues declined throughout the period to 1982. This was due to the 
shrinking tax base and controlled regime. The tax base on cocoa and imports 
declined throughout the period. The cocoa tax base declined continuously from 
10.6% in 1974 to 2.5% in 1982. The imports tax base declined from 19.5% in 
1974 to 6.8% in 1982.6 
The decline in the tax base was in part due to declining cocoa export volumes 
and imports, consequent upon the government's policies. It was in part also due 
to the increased shift of economic activities from formal channels to the parallel 
market. With a highly overvalued exchange rate and a general shortage of all 
commodities in the system, cocoa smuggling across the border, both for higher 
prices and the purchase of basic commodities, increased. Middlemen imported 
commodities through unofficial channels and priced them at parallel market rates 
(or what Ghanaians called "the World Bank rate" or "IBM rate") without paying 
taxes. 
While government revenues were declining throughout this period, expenditures 
were increasing. For this period government spending had no relation to budgetary 
plans. A political lesson that has been learnt by most political aspirants in Ghana 
dating back to the colonial days was that political success depended on the ability 
to minimize the discontent of the urban classes. Therefore, from 1975, as the rate 
of inflation accelerated and the controlled system failed to supply commodities, 
either in sufficient quantities or at controlled prices, urban unrest developed. To 
placate these groups, government expenditure financed by borrowing from the 
banking system increased. For the 1976/77 fiscal year, the original estimated 
deficit on current account was only around C20 million and the year actually 
ended with a deficit of C233 million. During 1977-78, though a surplus was 
envisaged originally, the government incurred a huge current account deficit of 
CI,119 million. Against a large surplus of C287 million envisaged for 1978-79, 
a deficit of C346 million was incurred during that year. 
Even though the deficits were incurred on account of large 
increases in expenditures by the government, an overwhelming 
6 4 RESEARCH PAPER 2 7 
proportion of the increases were on account of recurrent 
expenditure: development expenditures moved up slowly and far 
behind the rate of inflation. Thus, investment in the government 
sector in real terms recorded a declining trend (CBS, 1980, p. 22). 
With the introduction of the Economic Recovery Programme in April 1983, 
both the economy and government revenues responded positively. In 1983 tax 
revenues declined by 4.6% as a result of the drought and general collapse in the 
economy. However, from 1984, when GDP started growing in real terms, 
government tax revenues increased steadily from 1984 to 1988. Revenues from 
almost all sources increased.With continuous depreciation of the currency and 
payments of higher prices to cocoa farmers, export volumes increased resulting in 
higher revenues from export taxes. This was in spite of declining world market 
prices for cocoa. The London spot price for cocoa declined from 2113/tonne in 
1985 to 1146/tonne in 1988 (CBS, Quarterly Digest, September 1989). In 1988, 
however, according to World Bank estimates (World Bank, 1989), cocoa 
production fell by 6.8%. The combination of decreased cocoa exports and a lower 
world market price reduced tax revenues for cocoa exports by 31% resulting in 
a 15.8% fall in revenues from international transactions. This was, however, 
compensated for by increased earnings for other sectors. With increased export 
earnings and external donor support, imports increased in real terms throughout 
the period. 
While a major part of the growth in government revenues could be explained 
by the policy change and the response of the economy to the change, part of the 
increase could be explained by the broadening of the tax base and increased 
efficiency in tax collection. A combination of tax farming and re-organization of 
the tax administration was undertaken. The agency responsible for customs and 
excise duties was converted into services with a board of directors and conditions 
of service related to their tax performance. The collection of income taxes from 
commercial vehicle operations became the responsibility of the Ghana Private 
Road Transport Union (GPRTU) in return for a percentage of taxes collected. The 
GPRTU collects these taxes on a daily basis as the drivers report to commence 
operations for the day and has trained personnel to do on-the-spot checks on 
drivers for tax receipts for the day. 
In spite of the growth in revenues, the fiscal deficit continued to increase. Tax 
revenue less expenditure which was in deficit of C6.7 billion in 1983 increased 
throughout the period to C24.1 billion in 1988. However, overall budgetary 
surpluses were recorded in 1986 through to 1988, largely on account of non-tax 
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revenues. Grants, mainly from abroad in support of the budget, increased from 
C<H4 million in 1984 to CI 1,553 million in 1988, constituting about 7.5% of 
government revenue in that year. Substantial debt service relief was also obtained 
by the conversion of loans into grants by the major western countries. The 
increase in government expenditure therefore occurred largely as a result of 
domestic activities. 
With the massive devaluation of April 1983 and the drastic reduction in real 
wages, the government resorted to increasing wages, salaries and other benefits 
as a partial compensation. As a result, the employee compensation component of 
government expenditure increased from C5.3 billion in 1984 to C49.2 billion in 
1988. Purchases of other goods and services increased by a more moderate amount 
from C10.1 billion in 1984 to C29.2 billion in 1988. Development expenditure 
increased at a faster rate than recurrent expenditure. 
V Foreign capital and liberalization 
External capital flows could be crucial to the success or failure of a liberalization 
attempt. In the case of Korea, for instance, it has been documented that substantial 
external inflows contributed to the success of the liberalization experience 
(Helleiner, 1988). The two liberalization episodes in Ghana differed not only in 
terms of the liberalization package but also in terms of external donor support. 
In both periods, the government expected substantial external support when 
putting together the liberalization package. In the period 1967-69 the yearly 
average support from DAC member countries in the form of loans and grants 
amounted to US$75 million of which grants were US$16 million. The period 
1970-71 averaged US$82 million of which US$24 million was in the form of 
grants. These flows of loans and grants were equivalent to 18.3% and 17.5% of 
total imports for each respective period. These represented an increase in capital 
inflows compared with the 1966-67 period. The increase is in recognition of the 
donor community's expectation of a further liberalization episode by the 
government. But as Leith (1974) argues, these inflows were in danger of being 
overcome by repayments. Grants were insignificant in terms of budgetary support. 
In most years during this period it was less than 0.001% of total revenues. 
In contrast, the current programme has had substantial external assistance both 
as programme aid and budgetary support. As discussed earlier, by 1988 external 
grants constituted 7.5% of government revenue. External programme support was 
co-ordinated through the Paris Club Donors Conference. According to World Bank 
(1990) commitments from members and observers of the consultative group 
including IDA averaged US$420 million a year in 1984-86 and US$740 million 
a year between 1987-89. Drawings on loans increased from approximately 
US$272.6 million in 1983 to US$426.8 million in 1988. In the initial phases 
external resources including suppliers' credit and bilateral arrangements financed 
49.1% and.43.7% of total imports in 1983 and 1984 respectively. In 1985 this had 
declined to 37.1% (Ministry of Trade, 1986). As import liberalization started in 
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1986, the level of foreign funding increased to 54.3% in order to accommodate 
the increase in imports. 
Ghana's total stock of external debt stood at US$3.2 billion by the end of 1989. 
This was about 60% of GNP. Long-term public debt amounted to US$2.6 billion, 
32% of which was bilateral creditors, 44% from the World Bank and IDA, and 
17% from other multilateral sources (Table 27). 
External support has gone to the foreign exchange operations. The finances of 
the foreign exchange auction by foreign sources increased from about 40.6% in 
1986 to 69.3% in 1988 (Ministry of Trade, 1988). 
The significant inflow of foreign financial resources has financed the current 
account deficit and built up international reserves. Gross inflows of loans and 
grunts over the period 1983-89 have been crucial in supporting the structural 
adjustment programme in terms of the budget, balance of payments and financing 
of the auction. In contrast to the 1967-71 period where these inflows were 
approximately equal to 18% of merchandise imports, in the current period they are 
approximately 60%. At the initial phases, however, the programme had to rely on 
short-term borrowing from the IMF and other commercial sources. At this stage 
Ghana's creditworthiness was low and it was difficult to attract long-term 
concessional financing. The share of short-term credit in total external debt 
increased from 20.1% in 1982 to 26.3% in 1983 and 40.7% by 1985 (Table 27). 
As the programme progressed and creditworthiness improved, the share of long-
term concessional loans in financing the programmed increased. The current 
import liberalization programme has therefore not been constrained by the 
performance of the export sector. The inflows have allowed the programme to 
continue despite adverse developments in the international cocoa market. This 
contrasts with the abrupt end to the liberalization programme in 1971 when cocoa 
prices declined. The external support for the current programme has been more 
far-reaching than it was in the previous liberalization phase. 
Foreign direct investment played a more significant role in the earlier 
liberalization period than in the current programme. Even though it fluctuated 
from year to year, for the period 1967-71 foreign direct investment averaged 
US$31.4 million per year, whilst it averaged only US$5.6 million between 1983-
89. 
The current liberalization programme has also encouraged the inflow of private 
transfers by Ghanaians resident abroad. In 1983 these transfers were approximately 
US$4.02 million. They more than tripled to US$15.9 million in the following year 
and by 1987 had risen to US$122.4 million (IMF, 1990). 
Table 27 Ghana's external debt burden, 1980-1989 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 198S 
Total debt stocks (TDS) 1314 1416 1397 1598 1898 2174 2652 3134 3113 3078 
Use of IMF credit 105 28 75 331 515 701 786 867 762 787 
Short-term debt 131 276 206 90 238 183 173 180 108 67 
Total short-term (TST) 236 304 281 421 753 884 969 1047 870 804 
Interest (%) 1.7 2.6 5.9 2.2 1.9 4.2 4.7 3.1 1.0 2.8 
Maturity (years) 43.7 29.6 18.1 36.5 39.1 30.3 25.6 33.0 32.3 38.1 
Grace period (years) 9.7 7.3 4.3 7.7 8.5 7.2 6.2 8.5 7.9 8.9 
Grant element (%) 71.9 55.6 26.7 63.7 69.8 46.9 39.0 55.8 70.9 60.2 
Debt service ratios(%) 
a) excluding IMF 46.7 38.5 28.9 31.1 28.2 
b) including IMF 53.3 48.7 53.9 63.3 58.4 
TST/TDS 18.0 21.5 20.1 26.3 39.7 40.7 36.5 33.4 27.9 26.1 
Source: World Bank, 1990b, 1991. 
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It would seem from the Ghanaian experience, therefore, that substantial 
external assistance over a certain period may be essential for the success and 
continuation of a liberalization programme. In both liberalization phases 
imports rose significantly in response to liberalization attempts. This has been 
due to the release of pent-up demand and the necessity of supplying imported 
inputs to the import-strangulated tradable goods sector. In an economy highly 
dependent on imported inputs, the growth objective of the import liberalization 
programme may not be achieved without these inflows since the ability of the 
relevant sectors to respond will be constrained by the non-availability of 
required imported inputs. However, the subsequent debt burden when most of 
these inflows are loans could have adverse implications for future balance of 
payments positions. A second limitation of the usefulness of foreign inflows 
relates to the absorptive capacity of the economy and the possible build-up of 
reserves and appreciation of the currency. There may be a significant 
relationship between external inflows, the exchange rate and inflation. This has 
been a concern expressed in Ghana. 
VI The trade and payments regime and 
inflation 
Inflation can be analyzed in terms of monetarist or cost-push views. 
Monetarists argue that cost-push factors such as food prices, wage or exchange 
rate changes can only cause a shift in the price level but cannot lead to 
sustained inflation. For this to happen, there is a need for monetary 
accommodation, without which the inflationary process stalls. Chhibber and 
Shafik (1990) argue that while money can be viewed as the proximate cause 
of inflation, cost-push factors can drive directly or indirectly by bringing about 
changes in the rate of monetization and velocity of circulation of money. This 
process works through the impact of exchange rate and wage changes, as well 
as changes in other administered prices which affect the fiscal deficit. When 
the deficit gets monetized, inflation results. This process has been found to be 
important in Ghana. 
Monetary and cost-push factors can finally result in excess demand which 
could be inflationary. As argued in Leith (1974), a country's trade and 
payments systems affect the nature of adjustment between aggregate demand 
and aggregate supply. A response to increased expenditure on aggregate supply 
must involve some adjustment via increases in imports and in the price of 
domestic output or a reduction in the value of expenditure components. If the 
system permits a free flow of trade and payments without quantitative 
restrictions, then for a small country, the domestic price level of tradables is 
linked directly with international prices of the same goods. Under these 
circumstances, aggregate demand pressure is vented largely on external balance 
with increased imports and decreased exports; the domestic price level of 
tradables is given by international prices. If adjustment via the external balance 
is blocked by controls on imports, the link with international prices is cut. 
Aggregate demand pressure is then turned onto the domestic price level to 
achieve adjustment, leaving unsatisfied excess demand for imports. 
The level of excess demand of a country at the point of liberalization is 
important in explaining the inflationary situation. The inflationary situation will 
be worsened if excess demand exists at the time of liberalization. Excess 
demand in Ghana was generated using a simulation approach. Following 
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Chhibber and Shafik (1990) excess demand in the goods market is assumed to 
be equivalent to excess supply in the money market. This assumption is based 
on Walras's law and is supported by the fact that in Ghana the substitution 
between money and goods is far more important than that between money and 
other financial assets. The excess supply of money was specified as the log 
difference of real money supply to real money demand. A demand function as 
estimated by Sowa (1989) is used to simulate the excess supply with its 
equivalent to excess demand (see Table 30). 
Reg imes a n d impact on inf lat ion 
The rate of inflation was generally under 7% until 1964 when it hit 16% 
(Table 28). Before 1959, the balance between aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply was maintained. However, in 1959, as a result of the desire to speed up 
development, the government incurred a substantial deficit, creating an excess 
of total expenditure over output. With a fixed exchange rate and a fairly 
liberalized international trade and payments regime, the adjustment resulted in 
increased imports of goods and services (Sowa, 1989, p.38). The value of total 
imports shot up by 34% from NCI69 million in 1958 to NC226 million in 
1959. This demand was met via a current account deficit which was financed 
by drawing on foreign exchange reserves and external capital account 
borrowing, largely on the part of government. The pressure on aggregate 
demand was, therefore, largely unleashed on the external balance and not on 
domestic prices. 
The rate of inflation became a problem from 1964. The period 1961-63 had 
an average inflation rate of 6% a year. Although the controlled regime had 
been initiated in 1961 as a result of balance of payments problems, the rate of 
inflation for this period was low because there were sufficient imports to 
contain aggregate demand. This is supported partly by the fact that reserves 
dropped from NC297 million to NCI47 million in 1961 (Leith, 1974, p. 38). 
Besides, excess demand had just begun to develop (Table 30). Table 29 shows 
that 1963 recorded no growth in money supply indicating it was also under 
control. 
The inflationary situation became serious between 1964-66, averaging about 
18% a year. The period recorded severe shortages of basic consumer goods. 
The world price of cocoa fell to its lowest level ever in 1965, contributing to 
a precarious foreign exchange position. Excess demand increased steeply from 
C454.3 million in 1963 to C4,098.5 million in 1964 before dropping to 
CI,409.3 million in 1967 (Table 30). In an effort to absorb the excess demand 
spilling over into imports, higher taxes on imports were imposed during this 
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period. This resulted in an increase in the effective exchange rate for imports 
by almost 33% in 1966 compared with 1960. This was not enough to keep 
relative prices of imports in line with the domestic price level. This was 
reflected in the rate of inflation increasing from 16% in 1964 to 23% in 1965 
before declining to 6% in 1969. 
Table 28 Rate of inflation, 1961-90 
Year Rate Year Rate 
1961 6 1976 55 
1962 6 1977 116 
1963 5 1978 73 
1964 16 1979 55 
1965 23 1980 50 
1966 15 1981 116 
1967 10 1982 22 
1968 11 1983 123 
1969 6 1984 40 
1970 3 1985 10 
1971 9 1986 24 
1972 11 1987 40 
1973 17 1988 31 
1974 19 1989 25 
1975 30 1990 37 
Source: rate calculated from CPI, CBS, Quarterly Digest, 1980, 1989; CBS, Economic 
Survey, 1969 
Budget deficits as a proportion of GNP increased from 7.8% in 1965 to 8.9% 
in 1966 before declining (Table 30). Part of the deficit seemed to have been 
monetized. From a zero growth in the money supply in 1963, there was a steep 
increase in M2 of 32% (Table 29). The rate of money supply also reached the 
highest level of 23.9% in the 1960-66 period in 1964. Thus, monetization of 
deficits and high excess demand contributed to the high rate of inflation over 
the 1964-66 period. 
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Table 29 Change in money supply 1963-75 (%) 
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Year M1 M2 Year M1 M2 
1963 0 0 1976 42 37 
1964 41 32 1977 67 60 
1966 8 7 1978 73 69 
1967 -4 0 1979 13 16 
1968 8 9 1980 30 34 
1969 11 11 1981 55 51 
1970 7 10 1982 19 23 
1971 3 9 1983 49 40 
1972 - 43 1984 61 54 
1973 - 18 1985 43 46 
1974 25 28 1986 44 48 
1975 44 38 
Source: calculated from money supply figures, CBS, Economic Survey, 1969; CBS, 
Quarterly Digest, 1980, 1988. 
The import liberalization period 1967-71 marks a phase corresponding to 
a low rate of inflation. The lowest inflation rate since 1961 was 3% in 1970. 
The rate of inflation was declining from the 1965 high of 23% when the 
import liberalization was attempted in 1967. Excess demand declined over the 
1964-66 period to the lowest level in 1966 before liberalization was initiated. 
Although excess demand began to grow progressively from 1967, aggregate 
demand seemed to have been contained. The comparatively low deficit rates 
which averaged 5.3% combined with low money growth rates and increased 
imports explain the containment of aggregate demand. These reasons account 
for the low inflation rate over the period. 
The inflation rate which began to rise in 1971 continued throughout the 
period 1972-82. This period can be described as the most inflationary in 
Ghana's recent economic history. From a rate of 30% in 1975, inflation peaked 
at 116% in 1977 and closed the decade at 54%. This controlled period saw a 
noticeable fall in total import volumes compared with other periods. 
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Table 30 Some key financial indicators 1966-88 (%) 
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Excess demand 
Year (m. cedis) M2/GDP Deficit/GNP 
1960 - 18.4 -
1961 -910.6 18.7 -
1962 381.0 20.1 -
1963 454.3 19.5 -
1964 4098.5 23.9 -
1965 3147.7 20.5 7.8 
1966 1409.3 20.2 8.9 
1967 2631.7 21.2 5.4 
1968 3520.4 20.7 7.8 
1969 3861.2 19.5 4.0 
1970 4203.3 18.9 3.4 
1971 1890.1 20.0 5.8 
1972 6164.6 23.7 5.5 
1973 8712.9 22.7 4.5 
1974 10366.4 21.6 7.7 
1975 12042.1 26.3 11.9 
1976 12695.4 29.2 13.4 
1977 10746.8 27.3 13.3 
1978 10612.8 24.5 9.1 
1979 8156.2 21.1 5.9 
1980 7473.3 18.5 10.4 
1981 5310.7 16.6 5.9 
1982 5497.5 17.2 6.0 
1983 3463.8 11.3 2.5 
1984 3830.6 11.8 1.5 
1985 5089.3 14.0 1.6 
1986 6046.3 13.5 0.6' 
1987 6642.1 14.2 1.2' 
1988 7405.2 14.7 -
Note: * surplus 
Source: calculated from IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1988, 1989 
and 1990. 
The 1975-79 period recorded one of the highest budget deficits. The deficit 
rate peaked at 13.4% in 1976 before falling to 6% in 1982. The M2/GDP ratio 
which peaked at 29% in 1976 recorded an average of 22.6% which is the 
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highest for the 1950-90 period. The increase in money supply as depicted by 
changes in M2 was also the highest (Table 29). It appears, therefore, that the 
deficits were financed through an increase in the money supply. Thus while the 
money supply was increasing, translating into an increased aggregate demand, 
import volumes were declining. Excess demand over the period increased to 
the highest level in 1976 before dropping. With insufficient availability of 
consumables, due to shortages of local food items, Sahelian drought and 
bushfires of 1981-83, aggregate demand was vented on domestic prices. Thus 
this period's inflation exhibits a monetization of deficits which generated an 
increased excess demand as a result of shortages of supplies. 
Comparing this regime with the first controlled regime of 1961-66, the first 
one recorded comparatively low rates of inflation. The earlier years, i.e., 1961-
64 and 1972-75, coincided with the availability of consumables while the latter 
periods experienced scarcities. While the deficits of the second period were 
monetized, the government relied on accumulated reserves during the 1961-66 
period. 
The economy which had been contracting since 1981 hit its lowest level in 
1983. Severe shortages of local food items coupled with a high growth rate of 
the money supply resulted in the highest inflation rate of 123% in 1983. From 
that level, the rate of inflation dropped to 40% in 1984 with a further decline 
to 10% in 1985. Despite conscious policies under the adjustment programme 
such as credit squeeze and restraining of government expenditure, the rate of 
inflation resumed its upward trend. Between 1986 and 1990, inflation averaged 
about 32%. The drop in the inflation rate in 1984 and 1985 could be explained 
by the exceptionally good weather and bumper harvest of staples. It should 
also be noted that by 1983, most items on the market were priced at the 
parallel market exchange rate so that the subsequent devaluations of the 
currency were just catching up with the already high parallel prices. 
This liberalization period (1983-90) has a higher average inflation rate than 
1967-71. This could partly be explained by the fact that the current period 
began with a higher excess demand and partly by a wider divergence between 
the parallel and official exchange rates. One other possible reason could be the 
increased cost of production as a results of the continuous depreciation of the 
cedi during the current period. 
In general, periods of liberalization coincided with lower inflation than 
controlled periods. This is despite the theoretical possibility that liberalization 
with floating exchange rates could be inflationary. The control period of 1961-
66 did not suffer from serious inflation because of the reliance on external 
reserves and availability of goods and services. The control period of 1972-82 
experienced the highest budget deficits and monetary expansion compared with 
the other periods. Furthermore, shortage of consumer goods and services was 
54 
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more predominant during this controlled period. It could be noted that the rate 
of inflation in the current liberalization period has remained below the 1972-82 
period partly because of increased inflow of foreign resources which have 
improved both the budget situation and import supplies. 
VII Summary and conclusion 
The effects of changes on the trade and payments regime of the trade balance 
cannot be determined a priori. The evidence from Ghana suggests that 
liberalization with a real depreciation of the exchange rate is more likely to 
lead to improved export performance. In all cases, the liberalization led to an 
increase in import volumes and real import values. But whether it improves the 
trade balance or not will depend on the terms of trade and the accompanying 
macroeconomic constraints on imports. 
The change in the composition of imports deliberately effected in 1961 
through the use of an import licensing system has not changed. In the short run 
liberalization has not had any significant effect on the composition of imports 
because of the structure and nature of industry in Ghana. It is possible that in 
the long run, as the liberalization process continues, significant changes in 
relative prices and changes in the structure of industry could induce a change 
in the composition of imports. 
The level of external support is important in determining the sustainability 
of a trade and payments liberalization programme. This is evident from the 
divergent experiences of the two liberalization exercises. This is especially so 
when the terms of trade are unfavourable. A conducive macroeconomic climate 
may not be sufficient to attract adequate foreign direct investment. 
There is a tendency for higher budget deficits to occur during controlled 
regimes compared with liberalized regimes. This has not been simply a 
question of the differences in fiscal restraint, but because revenues have 
generally increased during liberalized periods. 
During periods of controls it was found that budget deficits were generally 
monetized, in contrast to the liberalized period. Following from this, and also 
from the inability of excess demand to be satisfied through imports, controlled 
periods are associated with higher rates of inflation. 
The Ghanaian experience also provides lessons for the sequencing of trade 
reforms. The liberalization episodes were preceded by stabilization and 
exchange rate adjustments. The gains made during stabilization should be 
maintained in subsequent years. 
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All the important ingredients for a sustainable liberalization package seem 
to have been met in the current Ghanaian exercise. The sustainability of this 
programme, however, has depended critically on external support which, if 
suddenly curtailed, can bring the programme to an abrupt halt. Since the 
availability of external financial resources is the one element of the package 
which is beyond the control of domestic policy, it is essential that the 
liberalization programme provides the basis for sustainable growth of the 
Ghanaian economy. If this does not happen, the external inflows will be the 
Achilles heel of the programme because of the implications for meeting future 
debt obligations resulting from current external inflows. 
An emerging issue of concern for policy analysis is the relationship 
between external inflows, absorptive capacity of the economy, reserve 
accumulation on the one hand and the exchange rate and increasing inflation 
on the other. These have implications for export incentives and the balance of 
payments. 
Notes 
1. 1979 was an exception because of the political developments during this 
year. It was the year of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and a 
change to a new civilian regime in September. 
2. A weakness of these studies is the lack of consistent criteria to indentify 
and therefore compare liberalization episodes across countries (Greenaway, 
1993). 
3. In discussing balance of payments, two caveats with respect to data are 
necessary. Substantially different conclusions can be arrived at by analyses 
of the same period on the valuation of exports and imports. In most World 
Bank publications, imports are recorded CIF whilst exports are FOB. IMF 
publications report both FOB. For uniformity of valuation both exports and 
imports are reported FOB for this analysis. 
4. This section is based on comments by an anonymous referee. 
5. Estimates of the ratio of consumer goods imports to total domestic 
consumption have not found any significant difference in these ratios 
between the different trade regimes. The average for the period 1967-71 
was 5.84 %, it declined to 2.77% during the control period 1972-82. It 
was approximately 1.65% in 1983 and 1984. However, it has increased 
since then to 4.16% in 1987, declining to 3.35% in 1988. 
6. For a discussion of different measures of fiscal deficit and its application 
to Ghana, see Islam and Wetzel (1991). For a discussion of the limitations 
of the conventional measure in an inflationary situation, see Blejer and Chu 
(1988). 
7. Leith, 1974, Tables II-1, and II-2. 
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8. Frimpong-Ansah: based on three-year moving averages of cocoa, exports, 
imports and GDP. The tax base is the ratio of the relevant sector to GDP. 
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